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
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GO WORLD

Summer 1989 NO.56



THE ISHI PRESS



Kobayashi evens the score by defeating Awaji in the second game of the Meijin title match.

Feature Articles in this Issue

Cho Hun-hyun Takes the Ing Cup



Cho Hun-hyun of Korea walks away with the biggest prize in go history, \$400,000, after coming from behind to defeat Nie Weiping of China. In the process, he made 5 million fanatical Korean go fans very happy. In this issue we present the first three games of the playoff. (The figure 40 in the cartoon precedes the character for 10,000.)

See page 19 for our report.

Two Fujitsu Cups in a Row for Takemiya



もう痛くない？ 陽性男

The caption to the cartoon (like the Ing cartoon, by Ayusawa Makoto) reads: 'Doesn't hurt any more? The positive man.' The cast on Takemiya's leg is marked, 'The Honinbo Title', and the globe of course represents the Fujitsu Cup. That sums up the story: Takemiya may be doing badly on the local scene in Japan, losing both the Kisei and Honinbo title matches, but he's still a star on the world stage.

For commentaries on the final and the game in which America's Jimmy Cha almost upset Cho Hun-hyun, see page 10.

Kobayashi Defends Kisei Title Again



When Kobayashi first won the Kisei title in 1986, Otake Hideo predicted that his reign at the top would last about two years. Well, Kobayashi had proved more durable than Otake expected and has now held the Kisei title for four years in a row.

This year he scored his most impressive triumph, soundly rebuffing the challenge of an inform (at least until the title match started) Takemiya, who is his polar opposite as a go player. The Takemiya 'cosmic' style has the most fans in Japan, but the Kobayashi 'subway' style (as Takemiya dubbed it) showed that it is the most effective when it comes to winning.

In this issue we give an in-depth coverage of the title match.

The Treasury of Life and Death

Some life-and-death problems that should be an intriguing challenge for kyu players and some stimulating practice for dan players. See page 56.

Our cover

A go-playing scene painted on an *uchiwa* or non-folding fan. From the collection of Tanaka Fumio.

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Go World News

International Tournaments

1st Ing Cup

Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan of Korea made a brilliant recovery to defeat Nie Weiping 9-dan of China 3-2 in the final of the 1st Ing Cup. Cho was losing 1-2, but when the series was resumed in September he won two games straight to take the world's richest go prize of \$400,000. He also confirmed, as least as far as the next four years are concerned, the long-cherished conviction of Korean go fans that he is the world's number one player.

In our report on the Ing Cup, beginning on page 18, we present the first three games from the final with commentaries by Fujisawa Shuko.

2nd Fujitsu Cup

In contrast to the Ing Cup, the 2nd Fujitsu Cup was, like the 1st, a triumph for the Nihon Ki-in, and in fact the final featured the same two players as last year: Takemiya Masaki and Rin Kaiho (as Lin Hai-feng a citizen of Taiwan but playing for Japan). Once again Takemiya



*Fujitsu Cup place-getters:
3rd Cho, 1st Takemiya, 2nd Rin.*

prevailed, but he was having a bad time of it until Rin suddenly went haywire in a crucial stage of the middle game. For Takemiya's own commentary on the final, together with Kobayashi Koichi's commentary on the game in which Jimmy Cha, the dark horse of the tournament, almost upset Cho Hun-hyun, one of the favourites, see our Fujitsu report beginning on page 10.



Cho Hun-hyun (right) defeats Nie in the final game.



*Not everything has been going Takemiya's way this year,
but once again he comes out on top in the Fujitsu Cup.*

5th Japan-China Super Go Series

The score in this series still stands at 1-1, as the series has not been resumed since the 'Tiananmen incident', as the Japanese press refers to the events of June 4. However, it is rumoured that it will be resumed soon.

2nd Japan-China Tengen Match

The same two players faced each other in the 1989 Japan-China Tengen Match and the result was the same as in the inaugural match last year: a 2-0 win for Cho Chikun. Liu Xiaoguang of China must have had his confidence bolstered by defeating Cho in the 2nd Fujitsu Cup earlier this year, but once again he found how seriously Cho (born in Korea) plays when he is representing Japan.

The games were played in Shanghai on 23 and 24 August and they represent the first go contact at this level since May.

Takemiya Wins 1st TV Asian Championship

Takemiya followed up his Fujitsu triumph with a win in yet another new international tournament, this one a TV championship among the top two place-getters in the NHK Cup in Japan, the CCTV Cup in China, and the KBS King of Go Tournament in Korea.

In the first round, Nie Weiping (2nd in the

CCTV Cup) beat Suh Nung-ook 8-dan (2nd in 1988 KBS), Kobayashi Satoru (2nd in NHK) beat Ma Xiaochun (winner of CCTV), and Takemiya beat Kim 7-dan (2nd in 1987 KBS). The winner of the KBS tournament in 1987 and 1988, Cho Hun-hyun, was too busy to participate.

Of the three winners in the first round, Takemiya drew the lot to go directly to the final, whereupon Kobayashi Satoru put on a sterling performance to defeat Nie. That meant that the final was a replay of this year's NHK Cup, and the result was the same. Takemiya won, but Kobayashi Satoru did all the hard work, defeating the Chinese number one and two players. The five games were telecast on NHK satellite TV from 21 to 25 August.

Otake Wins 2nd IBM Lightning Go Open Championship

Otake Hideo scored an upset win over Ishida Yoshio in the final to take the 2nd IBM Lightning Go Championship. Ishida came very close to emulating Takemiya in the Fujitsu Cup by making it two championships in a row, but his hopes were dashed when he let Otake recover from a bad position in the final.

A report on the early rounds of this tournament starts on page 25. Below are the details of the main games from the third round on.



Yoo 3-dan of Korea was the dark horse of the tournament.

The third round, played at the Nihon Ki-in on 4 September, saw the biggest surprise of the tournament, with Yoo 3-dan of Korea defeating Takemiya, last year's losing finalist. Yoo was then eliminated by Otake in the quarter-finals (the fourth round), played on the same day, so that meant that all the overseas players had been eliminated from the tournament.

Full results in the quarter-finals:

Ishida Yoshio 9-dan beat Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan, Yoda 7-dan beat Ohira 9-dan, Hikosaka 7-dan beat Cho Sonjin 5-dan, and Otake beat Yoo.

Semifinals:

Ishida beat Yoda by 6 1/2 points, Otake beat Hikosaka by resignation.

Final:

Otake beat Ishida by 2 1/2 points.

Playoff for 3rd place:

Hikosaka beat Yoda by resignation.

The above four games were all played on 7 October.

Japanese Tournaments

Kobayashi Koichi Defends Gosei Title

Imamura Toshiya, the 23-year-old 8-dan from the Kansai Ki-in, created a stir this year, first by defeating Cho Chikun in the playoff to become the Gosei challenger, then by taking the first game of the title match against Kobayashi Koichi.

For a while it looked as if the Kansai K-in might have the new star it has been waiting for. Imamura had only played Kobayashi twice before this match and had won both times, so this gave him a 3-0 record against him. However, the canny title-holder made a comeback in the second game, then commented: 'I've pretty well worked out Imamura's style in the first two games, so now I should be able to play at my own pace.'

Kobayashi was as good as his word, playing very forcefully and confidently in the next two games and crushing the challenger. He showed that he's not the Japanese number one for nothing, but still the series was valuable experience for Imamura. He is a vigorous, large-scale player who always looks for the fighting move; we can expect to see more of him in the future.


The results:

Game 1 (7 July). Imamura (B) won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 2 (18 July). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (28 July). Kobayashi (W) won by 3 1/2 points.

Game 4 (11 August). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.



Imamura Toshiya is perhaps the Kansai Ki-in's main hope for the future, but in his first title challenge he was outclassed by Kobayashi. Imamura is 23, the age at which Ishida Yoshio and Rin won their first big titles, but he was unable to follow in their footsteps.



Sheer tenacity and never-say-die fighting spirit enable Awaji to upset Kobayashi's lead in the first game of the Meijin title match, played in London.

Kobayashi Leads Awaji in Meijin Title Match

Awaji Shuzo surprised everyone not only by coming from behind to win the Meijin league but also by besting the title-holder in the first game of the title match. However, Kobayashi Koichi has recovered to take the second and third games.

After pegging along in second place (or lower) for most of this year's league, Awaji got his chance when Rin Kaiho lost to Cho Chikun in

his final-round game, played on 10 August. Takemiya, the leader for the first five rounds, put himself out of the picture completely by losing his last three games. If Takemiya had won his last game, against Kato, he would have qualified for the playoff with Rin, and Awaji would have missed out, as the rule in the Meijin league is that only the two higher-ranked players qualify for a playoff.

14th Meijin League

Rank	Player	KM	R	C	F	T	I	H	A	KK	Score	Place
1	Kato Masao	—	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3 — 5	6
2	Rin Kaiho	1	—	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	6 — 2	2
3	Cho Chikun	0	1	—	1	0	1	0	0	1	4 — 4	4
4	Fujisawa S.	1	0	0	—	0	0	1	0	1	3 — 5	—
5	Takemiya	0	1	1	1	—	0	0	1	1	5 — 3	3
6	Ishida Yoshio	0	0	0	1	1	—	1	0	0	3 — 5	—
7	Honda Kunihiisa	1	0	1	0	1	0	—	0	1	4 — 4	5
7	Awaji Shuzo	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	—	1	6 — 2	1
7	Kamimura K.	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	—	2 — 6	—

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Awaji didn't let this opportunity go to waste. In the playoff, held on 14 August, Rin took an early lead and seemed to have the game wrapped up, but Awaji hung on grimly. At the right time he staked the game on a bold attack, Rin slipped up, and Awaji had his upset, by 2 1/2 points.

Awaji modestly disavows any claim to being in the same class as Kobayashi; according to him, his forte is his ability to absorb punishment without being knocked out. He likes to compare himself to Rocky in the movie of the same name. The first game of the title match followed the same pattern, with Kobayashi establishing a lead, then playing a slack move that let Awaji stage one of his patented upsets.



This is Awaji's fourth attempt to take an open title. He lost the 1984 Honinbo title match to Rin 1-4, the 1983 Gosei title match to Otake 2-3, and the 1983 Tengen title match to Kataoka 1-3.

The second and third games were a different story. Kobayashi turned on the power, just as he did in the Gosei title match, and overwhelmed the challenger with his aggression. The third game, in particular, featured all-out fighting from beginning to end; it was the kind of spectacular brawl you don't see very often in title matches these days. However, Kobayashi always held the initiative and after an exchange of two large groups he came out on top. The *Go Weekly* reporter commented that he couldn't remember a game in which the players following the game in the pressroom got so excited over what was happening. The game was even more spectacular

than the first game of the 29th Honinbo title match when Awaji challenged Rin Kaiho in 1984 (GW38), and we look forward to presenting it in *Go World*.

With Kobayashi having recovered from his bad start, go journalists are now recalling the pattern of his recent title matches. In the 1988 Meijin, the 1989 Kisei, and the 1989 Gosei, he dropped the first game in each case, but didn't lose any after that. However, we can be confident that Awaji hasn't lost heart yet: he's used to being the underdog and above all else he's a fighter.

45th Honinbo League

The upcoming Honinbo league promises to be a very interesting one, as two of the great players of go history will be making reappearances after spells on the sidelines. The veteran players who have declined to step aside for the younger generation are Sakata Eio and Fujisawa Shuko. Sakata, who will celebrate his 70th birthday on 15 February next year, dropped out of the 42nd league with a 2-5 score; his record of seven Honinbo titles in a row in the 1960s is second only to the late Takagawa's nine in a row in the 1950s. He holds the title of Honorary Honinbo that Takemiya missed out on by losing this year (a player must win five times in a row to qualify). Fujisawa Shuko, who turned 64 on 14 June this year, has been enjoying excellent form recently. Although he dropped out of the Meijin league this year, he only has to win one more game in the preliminary round to get back in; he has also won a place in the final section of the Kisei tournament for the first time since 1983 (when he was seeded after losing the title). His record to the end of September is 22-10, his best in recent years. He last played in the Honinbo league seven years ago (the 38th league).

The other two newcomers to the league are Yoda Norimoto 7-dan, making his debut, and Rin Kaiho, a veteran member of the league who failed to win a place in the 44th league after a record 24 successive appearances (years as title-holder, five in Rin's case, are counted in the sequence). This put on hold Rin's attempt to better Sakata's record of 32 league appearances, but now he's in the running again. Sakata's total includes 20 successive appearances, which puts him just behind Takagawa's 21 (total 22). In fourth place is Takemiya, who with 18 appearances in a row is within shooting distance of Rin's record. Just for the record, only 67 players in all have

won places in the 45 leagues to date, despite the fact that half of the players drop out each time.

The first round in the new league has already been played. On 5 October, Sakata beat Yoda by 2 1/2 points and Rin beat Kataoka by resignation. On 11 October, Takemiya beat Fujisawa Shuko by resignation. On 12 October, Otake beat Kobayashi Koichi by resignation.

15th Meijin League

The pairings in the playoffs for the three vacant places in the league are as follows: Otake v. Kataoka, Fujisawa Shuko v. Kobayashi Satoru, Yoda v. Sakaguchi.

14th Kisei Tournament

Rin Wins 9-dan Section for 4th time

The first stage of this tournament has been completed and the following players won the respective dan-sections. Other place-getters listed are those seeded into the second stage.

1-dan: Koyama Ryugo

2-dan: Miyazaki Shimako

3-dan: Yo Kaei

4-dan: Shinoda Hideyuki

5-dan: Enda Hideki

6-dan: Komatsu Hideki

7-dan: Yoda Norimoto; 2nd: Tei Meiko

8-dan: Imamura Toshiya; 2nd: Kamimura Kunio

9-dan: Rin Kaiho; 2nd: Otake Hideo; 3rd: Kato Masao, Ishida Yoshio; 5th: Fujisawa Shuko, O Rissei.

Kisei Challenger Otake or Takemiya/Cho

The above players qualified for the second stage, in which results to date are as follows.

Miyazaki beat Koyama, then lost to Yo, who beat Shinoda, but then lost to Enda. Enda lost to Komatsu, who then beat Tei, thus gaining a place in the final stage in which the challenger is decided. Twelve players compete in this stage, with lots being drawn to seed four in the second round.

Results in the first round: Ishida Yoshio beat Imamura, O Rissei beat Yoda, Fujisawa Shuko beat Komatsu, Kato beat Kamimura.

Second round: Takemiya beat Ishida Yoshio, Cho beat O Rissei, Fujisawa beat Rin, Otake beat Kato.

Semifinal: Only one semifinal has been played so far, and in it Otake ended Shuko's attempt to make a Kisei comeback. In the best-of-three final Otake will play the winner of the other semifinal

between Takemiya and Cho.

Hane to Challenge Kato for Oza

Hane Yasumasa 9-dan, who will be remembered for the rest of his career as the man who finally won a Super Go series for Japan by defeating Nie Weiping, will make his first challenge for a major title at the 'mature' age of 45. His victory over Nie has been a great stimulus to Hane, and in the 37th Oza tournament he has displayed the best form of his career, defeating Takemiya, Rin, and Cho Chikun to reach the final. On 21 September he defeated the other finalist, Awaji Shuzo, to earn the right to challenge Kato Oza. Hane won with his favourite fuseki, the high version of the Chinese opening, in which he is a specialist. Given Kato's bad form these days, Hane has to be given a good chance to take the title; on the other hand, Kato holds a record for 'longevity', having won at least one title a year for the last 13 years, so he can be expected to offer fierce resistance.

Hane is also doing well in the Tengen title, where he is slated to meet Rin Kaiho in the playoff to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun. In this tournament he had a slightly easier path to the final, but once again one of his wins came at the expense of Takemiya.

Late news. Playing black, which automatically means that he played the high Chinese opening, Hane won the first game of the Oza title match by half a point. The game had an interesting ending. With only the dame points left to play, Hane had one risky-looking position, but he declined to reinforce it, as he would then have lost by half a point. Kato accepted the invitation to attack inside Hane's group, but Hane answered accurately and pulled off a win.

TV Tournaments

Here is an update on TV tournaments held in Japan in the first half of this year.

36th NHK Cup: Takemiya beat Kobayashi Satoru in the final, winning this title for the first time after four second places (in 1975, 1977, 1984, and 1986).

11th Kakusei Tournament: O Rissei, making his first appearance in this knockout tournament, defeated Cho Chikun, Kato, and Yamashiro to reach the final. His opponent was Hashimoto Shoji, who defeated Fujisawa Shuko, Kobayashi Koichi, and Ishida Yoshio. The playoff between the two, telecast on 20 March, was won by O Rissei.



O Rissei wins his first TV title.

8th NEC Cup: Otake Hideo won this title for the second time, defeating Ishida Yoshio in the final.

4th NEC New Stars Tournament: O Meien 8-dan, who has appeared in three of the four finals to date, defeated Yoda 7-dan, who likewise has played in three finals (winning one).

Miyazaki Wins 1st Women's Meijin

This is a new title which ranks as one of the three major women's titles, along with the Women's Kakusei and the Women's Honinbo. Like the former, it was won by the new star Miyazaki Shimako 2-dan. Alone among Japanese professional tournaments, the Women's Meijin is run by the Swiss system, with the eight players who have won their way through the preliminaries meeting in a four-round tournament. Miyazaki was the undisputed leader, with four straight wins. Second was Kusunoki Teruko, holder of the Women's Honinbo title, on 3-1.

Another unusual feature of this tournament, which was inaugurated in February 1988, is that it is the first professional tournament in Japan in which amateurs are allowed to participate in the preliminary rounds. Miyazaki (age 22) also won the 10th Women's Kakusei Cup in 1988.

News continues on page 61.

In Memoriam: William Pinckard

We are very sorry to have to report the death of William Pinckard from cancer in early October 1989. He was a very old and close friend of the editor and the publisher of this magazine and he was also a valued adviser, both for his broad literary interests and for his unrivalled knowledge of the historical and artistic background of go. In recent years he had suffered from recurrent bouts of cancer, but successful treatment with chemotherapy had brought about a remission, so his sudden death came as all the more of a shock.

Through his generous advice, Bill had a big influence on the face that Ishi Press presented to the world. It was his idea to use go prints as cover illustrations of the magazine and books, beginning with *The Dictionary of Basic Joseki* in 1976. This was an idea subsequently imitated by the Japanese go press. In many cases, he also offered the painting to be used from his large collection of go art, which incidentally was one of only two collections of such scope in existence.

A couple of years ago *Kido* made a special photographic report on Bill and his collection, and on that occasion he wrote a short account of how he came to take an interest in go art. We would like to quote from it:

'Subject was born in Showa 2 (1927) and spent his childhood in Asia. Parents had married in Japan (a civil ceremony conducted by the Mayor of Kobe), and owing to these facts subject has always felt an affinity with the country. Subject began collecting prints in a desultory fashion while in Tokyo serving in the U.S. Army of Occupation in 1946. After graduating from university and working at a variety of jobs, meanwhile becoming interested in Buddhism, subject went back to Japan in 1959 in order to perform the 88-temple pilgrimage in Shikoku (*hachijuhakka-sho no junrei*, as it is known). At the end of this, which took nine months of weary slogging on foot, including time for rest and recuperation along the way, subject fell sick and was hospitalized in a remote country clinic for several weeks. The only reading matter available was back copies of *Kido*. From this point subject marks the beginning of a long slide into go madness. He had been a chess freak while attending the University of California in the 1950s. Now he soon became a living example of the old *senryu*, *Tatta hitoban to uchihajimeta wa kino nari* (Saying 'just one game', they began to play . . . That was yesterday). (Continued on page 18)

The Irrepressible Takemiya

Fujitsu World Champion Again

Takemiya is irrepressible: in the first half of this year, he met with disappointment after disappointment, suffering humiliating reverses in the Kisei and Honinbo title matches and squandering a 5-0 lead in the Meijin league, yet he bounced back to win the Fujitsu Cup for the second year in a row. This is a more impressive feat than defending a title, because, quite apart from the fact that the best players from all over the world are competing, the previous champion doesn't defend his title but has to fight his way through the knockout rounds again. Takemiya displayed a determination and tenacity that were missing in his title matches; in a couple of his games he came from behind to score upset wins. He may well be unique in the speed with which he shrugs off a setback that would have another player moping for months; his natural ebullience can never be suppressed for long.

In this issue we would like to present his own commentary on the final, but first let's have a look at a game promised in our last issue: the 'unlikely' quarter-final clash between the U.S.A. and Korea.

Jimmy Cha v. Cho Hun-hyun

This game came within an ace of being the biggest upset in the annals of international go. This comment may sound like an exaggeration, but it's easily justified. Cho Hun-hyun has long been considered one of the handful of players with a claim to being the world's number one — for the last decade the contenders have been Cho, Nie Weiping and the current top Japanese title-holders — yet he was almost beaten by an unheralded 4-dan from the U.S.A. It's clear that Cho let Jimmy get ahead through overconfidence; the mystery is how Jimmy let slip an 'unloseable' game. Kobayashi Koichi, the Japanese number one who has so far failed to make his mark in the international tournaments, takes on the task of diagnosing what went wrong with both players.

White: Cho Chun-hyun 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Jimmy Cha 4-dan (U.S.A.)

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 3 hours each.

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 3 June 1989.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.





Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). As expected, Cho takes the lead early.


As mentioned in our interview article on Cha in the previous issue, these two are old friends. They played constantly when they were in the air force together as young men and more recently they have played quite a few games during a number of visits Cho has made to California. On black Cha only wins one or two games out of ten, but rumour has it that he does better when there's money on the game. In any case, he was very happy when he got black in the nigiri in this game.

White 16. If at 17, Black gets ideal shape on the left side with 'a'.

Black 23 is slack, according to Kobayashi: capping at 33 is the only move. As one possibility, he showed the sequence in *Dia. 1*, which is quite severe on White. In contrast, in the figure White gets a stone at 26, which eliminates the aji of the wedge at 'a'. This gives White an early lead.



Dia. 1: better strategy for 23



Dia. 2: an improvement on 28

With 28 it is White's turn to play a dubious move. Cho should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 2*. However, this mistake is not serious, so White's lead is unaffected.

Black 43. Provoking 44 loses points, but Cha is aiming at the centre group, so his main concern is to stop White from linking up with the side group. 'I could never play a move like this,' commented Kobayashi, who added that Cha is not a territorial player. He bases his game on attack and displays his real strength in the infighting.




Figure 2 (51-100)


Figure 2 (51-100). Overconfidence

Perhaps because Cha was such a familiar opponent and because he was ahead, Cho was playing very quickly. By 68 he had used only 25 minutes, to Cha's 63 minutes. And, in fact, he had a big lead. Kobayashi: 'Black can no longer catch up with ordinary measures.' Kobayashi put Cho eight points ahead on the board (his calculations: White has ten points on the right side, 12 on the bottom left, and 20 at the top, for a total of 42; Black has ten at the bottom right, and 12

each at the top right and bottom left, for a total of 34).

Cha therefore goes all out with 69. Usually Black would only extend as far as 71, which White would answer at 'a', but then Black would have no chance of catching up.

Invading at 70 is natural, but 72 is a mistake. This move should be at 1 in *Dia. 3*; White is already ahead in territory, so he should play thickly. Burrowing underneath as in the game lets Black build thickness on top and turns the large white group in the centre into a perfect target.



Dia. 3: correct for 72

Cha seizes his chance with 79. Black is thicker than he looks in this area, as Black 'b' is sente (White 'c', Black 'd' follow).

Black 83 is the vital point. Usually Black would extend at 88, but then White would play 84 and have an easy time of it.

Black 87 may seem to relax the pressure, but according to Kobayashi it is a good move. It threatens the group below, with the aim of engineering a double attack on it and the centre group.

Black 93. Cho commented that his position would have been hopeless if Black had crawled at 100 instead. Even so, Cha is dictating the flow of the game.






Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 3 (101-150). Cha takes an impressive lead.


Cha plays a series of satisfying forcing moves with 7 to 19, then strikes at the vital point with 21, a move which attacks White while also forestalling a cut. Profit is accruing to Black all over the board thanks to the severe pressure he is putting on the centre white group. At this stage Cho probably felt like crying.

Black 25 doesn't usually work, as White can counter with a hane at 27. Dia. 4 shows that White can capture the corner stones. However, thanks to the sente attacking moves Black has played in the centre (such as 23 in the figure), he can counter with 8 and 10, capturing the larger part of the group.


After 30, Kobayashi commented: 'Black has a lead of 15 points on the board. There's no way he can lose the game.' Other professionals following the game, such as Otake and Kajiwara, agreed that Cha had it wrapped up, but, as if to prove them wrong, things started to unravel.

First, Black 39. Kobayashi: 'If Black had played 39 at 'a', there's no doubting he would have had an easy win. [Calculates the score.] Cha would be 16 points ahead. Perhaps he's not satisfied unless the stones are coming to grips with each other.'

White takes a lot of profit with 44 to 56 in Figure 4. Black could have made ten points on the side here, instead of which White gets 15. Deducting the profit Black has taken on the bottom left, White has caught up about five points. That still leaves Black comfortably ahead, of course.



Dia. 4: White 1 backfires



Dia. 5: captured




Figure 4 (151-200)

85: connects (above 73)

Figure 4 (151-200). Looking for a way to lose


White 60. Dia. 5 shows why White can't connect.

Black 65 and 67 throw away the lead. If Black had defended the top with Black 70, his win would have been safe. According to Kobayashi [whose commentaries are proof of how scrupulously and often he calculates the territorial balance during a game], he would have been 13 points ahead on the board. When White plays 68 and 70, he gains ten points and Black loses eight. Cha hallucinated that 65 and 67 would be sente, but he cannot kill the centre white group.

White 80. If at 84, Black cuts at 'a' and kills him.

Black 83. If Black attacks White's eye shape with 1 in Dia. 6, White gets two perfect eyes with 4. If Black plays 3 at 1 in Dia. 7, then White 2 to 6 make miai of linking up and capturing two black stones.


This mistake only makes the game even. The losing move is still to come.



Dia. 6: White lives

Dia. 7: White lives

Black 99 finally throws the game away for good. When White answers at 100, 99 becomes an outright loss. It should simply have been at 100. Kobayashi worked out the sequence in *Dia. 8*. After 12, Black could switch to the hane at 'b' in the top left corner in the figure, and the game would be very close. Kobayashi couldn't say which side would have won. In the diagram White gets four points less than in the figure, so the game would certainly have been a half-pointer.



Dia. 8: the game could go either way

Kobayashi: 'Expecting Cha to keep his cool at this stage is probably unreasonable. His misreading of the life and death of the centre group must have hit him hard. Speaking from my own experience, I can say that you're in no state to play proper go at a time like this.'

Figure 5 (201-274). *A unique opportunity goes begging.*

After his spectacular wins over Yamashiro and Ohira, Cha let the biggest fish of all get away. If he had beaten Cho, later to become the Ing World Champion, he might not have been popular in Korea, but he would have been a hero to the rest of the go world. For a player making his first appearance in an international go tournament, he certainly made his presence felt.




Figure 5 (201-274)

74: connects (at 35)

Even so, he must be cursing his erratic play in the latter half of this game: it may be a long time before he again gets so close to beating a world champion.

In our previous issue, we reported a rumour that the Korean Ki-in (Han Kuk Kiwon) was considering promoting Cha to 7-dan. Unfortunately, this plan fell through, but we don't think anyone will be taken in by his 4-dan ranking next time he plays in the Fujitsu Cup. Incidentally, thanks to Cha, the U.S.A. will be seeded into the second round next year.

White wins by 4 1/2 points.

(From a commentary in the Yomiuri.)

Final: Takemiya v. Rin

As mentioned earlier, things didn't go very well for Takemiya in the first half of the year, but after losing the Honinbo title he blithely remarked: 'If I bomb out in Japan, there's still the world stage.' In the month he lost the Honinbo title (June), his winning percentage temporarily dipped under 50% (12 wins to 13 losses) for the year, but in July, which was a very busy month for him, he bounced back with seven wins to one loss. This was evidence of a very quick recovery from the shock of losing his title.

His opponent in the playoff was Rin Kaiho, another player who has demonstrated remarkable consistency in the Fujitsu Cup. Last year Rin beat Suh, Cho Chikun, and Nie to get to the final; this year he disposed of Liang (China), Ma, the

Chinese number two, and Suh again, this time in the semifinal. On paper, his opponents last year might look tougher, but he actually had a tougher time this year. Like Takemiya, he had a losing game against his Korean opponent in the semifinal, but he scored an upset by fighting a three-move approach-move ko and turning it into a real ko. This remarkable feat of perseverance caught Suh unawares and cost him a seat in the finals. Rin had no luck with his Judan title challenge to Cho earlier this year, but otherwise he had been having a great year, with 29 wins to eight losses as he went into this final. His outstanding form made him the favourite to take the first prize.

White: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Played on 5 August 1989 at the Tokyo Prince Hotel. *Commentary by Takemiya.*




Figure 1 (1-30)


Figure 1 (1-30). *Just lining stones up on the board*

As always, with black I play the sanren-sei. I hear people say that progress has been made with counterstrategies to the sanren-sei, but that doesn't mean that it will lose popularity. To paraphrase Shusaku, the sanren-sei will live as long as go is played on a 19x19 board.

I switched with 9, because just before this I had lost a Meijin-league game playing my usual 'a'.

Black 13 and White 14 both show fighting spirit. The sequence from 15 is a common one,


but, to state the case in extreme form, by 29 the game is already lost for Black. He's just lining up stones on the board. His play is completely without class. How could a player like me play such imbecilic moves as 23 and 25? I can only assume that I was nervous.




Dia. 1

If one is going to hane at 23, then continuing with 1 in *Dia. 1* is good style. Black plays tightly up to 7, securing corner territory; this will be a reasonable game.

Alternatively, making a diagonal connection with 25 at 'b' also looks good; if White blocked at 29, Black could slide to 'c', getting a much better result than in the game.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Rather than either of these moves, though, I should have invaded at 1 in *Dia. 2*: this was the only move. I wanted to play this light-footed move. If fighting spirit leads White to take a firm grip on the black stone with 2, Black could develop freely by jumping out to 3. If instead White attaches on top at 2 in *Dia. 3*, then the

hane at 3 will be just right. Black gouges out the top area with 5 to 9, completely destroying White's top area. In this result, the marked white stones have become bad moves that strengthen Black. Instead of 8 —

Dia. 4. White might try blocking at 1 in order to turn the marked black stones into bad moves (mochikomi or a loss without compensation), but then Black just plays a string of ataris, then squeezes, so contrary to White's intention the marked stones work very efficiently. White's top left corner also becomes thin, so in effect he has tricked himself in this variation.



Dia. 4

13: connects

Despite having read out all the above, I played 23 and 25. It was an unbelievable lapse for someone who is always advising others to play freely and follow their own natural inclinations. Black 23 and 25 are a kind of joseki, but they are so heavy that playing them is out of the question.

If I play badly, it's only natural that Rin should play well. White 30 is a calm move; it's subtle and profound. Connecting at 'd' would be bad style; if Black connected at 'b', then after exchanging 'e' for White 'f', hemming White in with Black 'g' becomes possible. White 30 eliminates this threat while also applying pressure to the black groups in the area.

Figure 2 (31–70). *Too impatient*

Black 31 forestalls White 60.

Scooping out my base with 38 is a good move that I overlooked. However, whether the sequence from 32 that preceded it is good or bad is a moot point. Omitting it in favour of playing 38 immediately is probably prettier.

Black 41. Black is in too much of a hurry. He has to be more patient, capturing a stone with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. Rin commented after the game that he would have forced with 4, then taken up position with 'a' in the figure, but Black is left with 'a' in *Dia. 5*, so he is thick. The position

might be bad for Black, but he could still hope to make a game of it.





Figure 2 (31–70)



Dia. 5

When White connects at 42, Black has to focus solely on flight, which is painful. Having to exchange 43 and 45 for 44 and 46 is a terrible minus. At this stage I felt quite gloomy.

Black 59. Black would prefer to play solidly at 60 and take aim at White's weak group, but if White intercepted at 'b', the black groups above and below would be subjected to fierce attacks.


Even so, permitting White to force with 60 on couldn't be more painful.

With 59 Black puts a brave face on it, pretending that his groups are linked up, but if the need arises White can make a strong attack with either White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' or White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g'.


The aim of invading at 70 is to establish a definite territorial lead. The opinion was expressed that White 'h' would have been good enough to win, but in a game fighting spirit naturally leads one to invade at 70.

At this point Black has to think hard. The conventional answer of 1 in *Dia. 6* would let White live with 2 to 8 and give him an easy win.

Using 3 to block at 1 in *Dia. 7* would be bad because of White 2 to 8, so . . .



Dia. 6



Dia. 7






Figure 3 (71-79)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9


Figure 3 (71-79). *At least Black's in the game.*

I attacked desperately with 71. If White made a hane at 1 in *Dia. 8*, my plan was to play 2 and 4 in sente, then attach at 6. If White 7, Black 8 is now severe. White 9 no longer works well, because the position has changed from *Dia. 7*.

Even when White extends at 72, attaching at 73 is still correct shape. Around this point the

game is incredibly difficult; doubtless Rin had just as much trouble with it as I did. The opinion was expressed that White could be satisfied to seek life with 1 to 7 in *Dia. 9*, but things are not so simple. Thanks to the exchange of the marked stones, Black can jump to 8. Even though White links up by attaching at 9, Black 10 and 12 make miai of fighting the ko and pushing through at 'a'. This was how I intended to play; Black has got ko threats against the white group on the right side, while if he is allowed to cut off a white stone by pushing through at 'a', he should be able to do OK on territory.


Crawling into the corner with 74 shows fighting spirit; it looks like the natural strategy. However, I did expect Rin to play 1 in *Dia. 10* first. In this case, descending at 4 looks best for Black, so White would be able to capture a stone with 5 and 7, easing the pressure on him. I intended to block at 8, bluffing that the whole right side was my territory, but I had no idea what would happen to my weak position in the centre (for example, the fierce attack of White A, Black B, White C in the figure); the only way to find out would be to play it out.



Dia. 10


Black 75 is thick, in various ways; I now felt that at least I was in the game. Using 75 to block at 78 would be too small. Playing on a large scale with 75 and 77, passing the buck to White, is the only way to go. Apparently Rin's analysis here got lost in a labyrinth. Taking profit with 76 is OK, but setting his stone in motion with 78 is a terrible overplay. To state the conclusion first, White should have taken the stopgap measure of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, then dodged to 5. Black has to

play 'a' next if he wants to take away White's eye shape, but when White jumps to 'b', it's hard to imagine that he will come under a really severe attack, so of the two of us White might perhaps have the more promising game.



Dia. 11

When White played the blunt move of 78, he could hardly have had realistic expectations of success. I blocked at 79 and was confident of being able to bring down one of the white groups. Rin said that he made misreading after misreading in this fight.




*Figure 4 (80-100)
98: captures (at 82)*

Figure 4 (80-100). White self-destructs.

White switches to and fro: just after playing the marked stone, he switches to 80 to the left, then he comes back to the right side with 82. One can hardly imagine that White was following a plan here: Rin's game had reached a zenith of chaos. And 82 was probably the losing move. White had no choice but to embark on an out-

and-out shinogi strategy [staking the game on the fate of a weak group] with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*.



Dia. 12

Dia. 12. If Black 4 and 6, White should be able to pull through with 7. Black would be worried if he had to stake everything on a simple attack at 'a'. Black could also try 4 at 5, followed by White 'b' and Black 6, but whether he will be able to link this attack with an attack at 'a' is unclear. In any case, attaching at 3 would have thrown the game into confusion. Rin's game fell to pieces before I knew what had happened.

White moves out with 86 and 88, but he has no chance of linking up with the other group. If White pushes along at A instead of 90, Black plays 93, White B, Black 95. In the end, White has no choice but to forsake his group at the top. Black plays calmly with 93 to 97, then solidly secures the capture with 99: he has pulled off a major upset.






Figure 5 (101–150)




Figure 6 (151–209)
95: connects (at 52)

Figure 5 (101–150), Figure 6 (151–209)

A thin black group captured the white group: what could be more efficient? All that Black has to do now is to take care that his group on the lower right side doesn't pop off. When he secures definite life up to 17, he looks like ending up about ten points ahead on the board.

Black 81 in Figure 6 widened the gap, but

White was probably just looking for a place to resign.

My honest reaction is that I was lucky I won. The gods may smile at me for saying so, but I intend to win next year too and make it three in a row.

White resigns after Black 209.

(‘Kido’, October 1989. Translated by John Power.)

Continued from page 9

‘Around 1965 subject became an art dealer, specializing in nishiki-e, and began to put together a private collection of go prints, becoming ever more interested in the history and legends of go and the social background which vivifies the history. He now has about 200 pieces in his collection, mostly prints but a few netsuke, okimono (ornaments), pieces of chinaware, etc., also.

‘Subject married and had two children, both girls, while living in Tokyo, and moved back to California, where he now lives, in 1978.’

Readers may remember the articles by Bill, unfortunately too few in number, that have en-

livened issues of *Go World*. His article on *senryu* (satirical poems) about go in GW15 is by far the most popular article we have published, judging by the amount of enthusiastic comment it has aroused over the years. At the time of his death, Bill was engaged in compiling an illustrated catalogue of his collection, with detailed explanations of the go themes and legends that are treated in the works. It was planned to publish the book through the Ishi Press, and we hope that this will still be possible.

Bill will be sadly missed by his many Tokyo friends, who have shared so many of those all-night sessions over the go board.

John Power

Cho Hun-hyun Takes the 1st Ing Cup

In our last issue our headline for our Ing Cup report announced that Nie Weiping was one win away from \$400,000. Well, that one win proved to be beyond his grasp, and the biggest prize in go history has gone to Korea's Cho Hun-hyun. After starting out the title match with a win, Cho seemed to be in trouble when he lost the second and third games, but he recovered to take two games straight and win the title. This feat establishes Cho as the world's number one player for the next four years.

After the first three games, played in China in late April and early May, there was a four-month break before the concluding games were staged at the Westin Plaza Hotel in Singapore. Cho won the fourth game, played on 2 September, by 1 1/2 points, then forced Nie to resign in the final game, played on 5 September. Nie has to be content with the second prize of \$100,000. The 2nd Ing Cup will start in 1992.

Commentaries on the final two games are not yet available, so in this issue we would like to present the first three games of the playoff, with commentaries by Fujisawa Shuko. According to Shuko, the players seemed a little nervous in the first two games, but seemed to mesh in the third game, which he considered the most interesting.

Game One

White: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan (China)

Komi: 7 1/2; time: 3 hours each.

Played in Hangzhou, China on 25 April 1989.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Nie's fuseki not up to his usual standards*

In Shuko's opinion, the bottom is more important than the left side in this fuseki, so Black should have played 13 at 'a'. White 14 and 16 work well, making White thick.

Black 33. Better to play at 34; if White hanes at 33, Black can be content to extend at 'b'. In other words, Black takes a point with 33 that White would be in no hurry to take, so securing his group's eye shape with Black 34 would be superior.

When White steals Black's base with 34, he has to move out with the rickety move of 37. White has the initiative.

White 44 and 46 are a good combination. Black has little choice about 47: 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* don't look very appealing.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (51-100)

88: connects



Cho is besieged by reporters after winning the first game of the Ing playoff.

Figure 2 (51–100). *White is already ahead.*

White 56 and 60 are a sacrifice to keep sente so that White can switch to 62. The game is flowing well for White and at this stage he may already have calculated that he has a win.

Perhaps Black 65 should be at 69 to take a tighter hold on the corner. When White gouges out the corner in sente, then occupies the strategic point of 80, the game looks good for him.




Figure 3 (101–170)

White 88. White doesn't need to play a ko by cutting at 89.

Figure 3 (101–170). *A good start for Cho*

White 12, 14. This combination shows in what good form Cho was in this game. When he plays 20, the game is over.

Moves 171 to 240 omitted. White wins by 3 1/2 points.


Game Two

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Cho Hun-hyun

Played in Hangzhou City on 28 April 1989.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–50) (next page). *A dubious 3–3 invasion*

Black 29 is a difficult point. Invading the corner fails to make effective use of Black's thickness on the lower right. On the other hand, play-

ing Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* would make the marked white stone work well [White gets a big corner, so Black 1 is usually played only when White has a one-space corner enclosure]. Shuko's suggestion, therefore, is that Black try the shoulder hit at 1 in *Dia. 2*. One should use thickness to attack. If next White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black can connect at 'd'; if instead White 'e', Black can extend at 'f'. Black can aim at invading the corner later on.






Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 2

Shuko also disliked Black 31. If instead Black followed *Dia. 3*, the marked stone (Black 27) would not yet be completely useless. After 7, Black could aim at setting up a large moyo with 'a' or 'b' at the top in the figure.

White 38 shows good judgement: if he blocked at 39, Black 'c' would be a nuisance.



Dia. 3

Black cuts with 39 and 41, but he has started a fight in the wrong area.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *Lack of fighting spirit*

Shuko: 'The instant Black connected at 59, I lost interest in seeing any more of this game. How could a player like Cho Hun-hyun show such poor fighting spirit? Surely attacking at Black 60 is the only move. If White cuts at 59, Black can simply answer at 'a' or 'b': the cut doesn't hurt him in the slightest. In practice, White wouldn't be able to ignore Black 60.'

'That makes it dubious that Nie's timing for 56 and 58 was correct.'

'White's play from 60 on is skilful and sure. His judgement that he can let Black enclose the centre is correct. By 100 he is way ahead.'

'Nie was nervous in the first game and Hun-hyun in this one. I find the failure of the two players to mesh a little dissatisfying.'

Moves 101 to 245 omitted. White wins by 9 1/2 points.

Game Three

White: Cho Hun-hyun

Black: Nie Weiping

Played in Ningbo City on 2 May 1989.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Clever sabaki*

Black 19, which shows Black's consciousness of the large komi, is quite a move. Actually even without a large komi this might be the way to play. This looks like becoming a game in which it

will be very hard to find the focal points with the usual josekis.

It's hard to choose between White 22 and 42. When White does play 22, Black naturally feels like extending to 25, so that he can aim at attacking the group later. I doubt that Black would play 25 if White had played 42.




Figure 1 (1-50)

38: ko; 43: ko; 47: connects (at 30)

The way Hun-hyun gets sabaki (settling his group) after his invasion at 26 is really something to see. When Black seeks to go on the attack with 27 and 29, White undermines his position by starting a ko with 30. This may look like nothing special, but this display of technique would be beyond an ordinary player.

Even if Black plays 33 before 31, the same ko will follow.

Well, Black is faced with a difficult decision. He can hardly back away from the ko by defending, but there is a possibility that his ko threat at 39 will become mochikomi (a loss without compensation), as it does in the game. Perhaps there is just no other way to play.

The moves from 44 to 47 seem reasonable: White defends at 44, turning the cut at 39 into a bad move, in exchange for the ko.

The way White creates aji with 48 and 50 is also clever. Even if Black adds another stone, that is, the marked stone in *Dia. 1*, after 51 in Figure 2, White can still make trouble with the hane at 1. The only way Black can hope to capture White unconditionally is with the placement at 2, but then White resists with 3 to 7 in the

corner and putting him down won't be easy. If Black 2 at 5 or 6, White plays a ko with 2.





Figure 2 (51-93)

84: ko (at 72)




Dia. 1

Figure 2 (51-93). More skilful play by Cho

Black can't capture the top with one move, so reducing White's moyo with 55 and 65 takes precedence. White also takes his time, preparing for the ko fight by playing thickly with 62 and 64. The way the players feel each other out at this stage is interesting.

This seems to be the right time to play 66. White forces Black to give way in the ko fight at the top (85), then both sides push their way out with 87 and 88. On weighing the gains for each in this fight, my conclusion is that Hun-hyun has skilfully settled his group and has a slight lead. Note that using 90 to block at 1 in *Dia. 2* (next page) might look feasible, but it would let Black bring his captured stones back to life with 2 to 6. Black would seem to gain from the exchange.

Nie follows hard on White's heels, taking the last large point with 93. In contrast to the first two games, the players are meshing well in this game. Now we come to the climax.



Dia. 2





Figure 3 (94-100)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (94-100). A great move

Hun-hyun grabbed territory with 94. This looked like the natural move, but not so. The flow of the game changed when Black played the superb move of 99.

I believe that the top priority for White was taking command of the centre with 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black 2, he answers cautiously with 3 to 7. He can expect to make endgame profit by attacking the two marked black stones (65 and 69 in Figure 2). This way White would maintain his narrow lead. Or White could try simply playing 5 and 7 immediately instead of 1.

My guess is that Hun-hyun regarded the centre lightly because he had already poked his head out with the marked stone. However, when he saw 99 he probably felt dismayed. I also overlooked this move. The more you look at it, the more you realize what a fine, profound move it is.




Figure 4 (101-171)

50: ko (right of 45); 54: connects (at 45)

Figure 4 (101-171). Missing the half-pointer


When Black pushes down in the centre with 9 and 13, he gets territory in the centre where his position had been thin. The effectiveness of 99 is striking.

I don't understand the rest of the endgame very well. In contrast to someone like me, these two rarely slip up in the endgame. I think we can trust them. The only thing is that instead of 24 I would block at 25. This is because I think that crawling at 25 makes White thin. Either way, the game's a half-pointer.

Instead of just 32, White would like to make double forcing moves with White A, Black B, White 32, but of course Black will answer A by connecting at 65. In answer to the quantifiable 32 and 34, Nie's 35 is a fine, full-bodied endgame move.

Ignoring 70 to push out at 71 is shrewd. This seems to settle the game. Consequently, instead of 70 —

Dia. 4. I'd prefer to preempt Black by pushing down with 1. Black will naturally play 2 [he can't let White take both these good points]; after 3 and 5, White could block at 'a'. This would still be a half-pointer, but with just a chance — an outside chance — that it might go White's way.



Dia. 4

Figure 5 (172–247). *Show me good go*

Rescuing a stone with 72 and 74 is also big, but Black now gets the 85–87 tesuji, which makes his lead definite. Having to add a stone at 94 couldn't be more painful.

In this game Hun-hyun got clever sabaki and the brilliance of his game surpassed Nie's. But when it comes to the kind of insight that produces a move like 99 in Figure 3, Nie may be

superior. It upsets me having to praise him so much, but I think that 99 is a great move.




Figure 5 (172–247)

130: connects (at 87); 146: connects (below 116)

I wasn't impressed with games one and two, but in game three the players showed me some fine go. This was a good game which showed the strengths of both players. I hope that they will continue to show me good games, and not just in the Ing Cup. If they play nothing but boring go, then I'll have to go out and fight again.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.

(‘Kido’, July 1989. Translated by John Power.)



Thanks to one outstanding move, Nie turned the tables on Cho and took the lead.

The 2nd IBM Lightning Go Open Championship



Ishida Yoshio is hoping to repeat his success in the inaugural tournament. Last year he confidently predicted before the tournament began that he would win it, though perhaps a winning margin of half a point was not part of his plan. This year he was more reserved, only claiming to be a safe bet as far as the semifinals. His opponent in the first round was Michael Redmond.

Hardly had the Fujitsu Cup finished than another international tournament got under way. Sixty-four players competed in the first two rounds of the main tournament of the IBM Lightning Championship, which were played at the Nihon Ki-in on 29 July. The 16 players who survived the first day included the favourites, last year's champion Ishida Yoshio and the second-place-winner Takemiya Masaki, and other such strong contenders as Otake Hideo, Yoda 7-dan, and a new face in international professional tournaments, Yoo 3-dan of Korea. For results in the third and fourth rounds, scheduled for 4 September, see our news section (page 2).

In theory, this is an international tournament, but it doesn't quite amount to a world lightning go championship (note that we are following the sponsors' translation of the title in calling it a 'lightning' tournament, even though with byo-yomi a game could easily last for two hours). The first prize of ¥4,000,000 puts the tournament on the same level as a Japanese TV title, and some top Japanese players, such as Kobayashi Kisei, do

not make the time to participate. Likewise, China and Korea do not send their very top players. Of the 64 players in the main tournament 50 are from the Nihon Ki-in and ten from the Kansai Ki-in, which leaves two places for China and two for Korea. One player each from Europe and the U.S.A. also participated in the first of the two Nihon Ki-in qualifying rounds. In that round, held on 29 May, Frederic Donzet of France lost to Inoue Naomi 2-dan; Joseph Wang of the U.S. beat Suzuki 2-dan, then lost to Koyama 1-dan. Wang's victory, incidentally, is the first by an amateur from a Western country over a professional in an international tournament. (On the home front, some top Japanese amateurs won games in the qualifying rounds, but none made it to the main tournament. The best effort was by Kikuchi Yasuro, who defeated three professionals but stumbled at the last hurdle, losing the second game in the second qualifying round.)


Though some stars were absent, it should be noted that a good selection of top players participated this year. Qian Yuping, one of the Chinese representatives, is the current TV champion in China; he was knocked out in the second round by Yoo Chang-hyeok 3-dan of Korea. Yoo, now aged 23, took 2nd place in the 6th WAGC in 1984. He subsequently turned professional and last year he defeated Cho Hun-hyun to take the Daewang title. Another top player who disappeared prematurely was Cho Chikun, who lost to Tozawa 9-dan in the first round. This left Cho at a loss what to do with himself in the afternoon: he had been looking forward to his first experience of playing two games in one day, which for professionals is another unique feature of this tournament.

In this issue, we would like to look at some interesting games from the first round, beginning with the highlight scene below from a game between Hane 9-dan, hero of the 4th Japan-China Super Go series, and Yuki Satoshi, a 17-year-old 6-dan who is one of the hopes for the future of the Kansai Ki-in.

Yuki played 1 in the diagram (next page) as a ko threat in the ko fight at the bottom right. Hane countered with a strong move at 2, whereupon Yuki went wrong by cutting with 3 and 5. After Black 6, the white stones cannot escape capture.

Instead of 3, White should have made a hane

at 'a'; after the forcing sequence Black 4, White 'b', Black 'c', he could then resume the ko fight. In the game Yuki fought on, but this early setback proved to be too big a handicap.



Hane (black) v. Yuki

Ishida v. Redmond

Last year Ishida made a much-quoted comment that slow games merely show who has the best stamina, whereas fast games show who is really the strongest player. Ishida is quite busy these days, as he was elected a director of the Nihon Ki-in last year, but it will be interesting to see if he can repeat his IBM success.



Michael Redmond ran into a formidable opponent in the first round. Western fans were hoping that he would make up for his failure in the U.S.A. Fujitsu qualifying tournament, but the 1st IBM Champion proved to be too much of an obstacle. Even so, it wasn't all plain sailing for Ishida...

White: Michael Redmond 6-dan

Black: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 30 minutes each, followed by 30 seconds byo-yomi.

Played on 29 July 1989 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *A good start, then a misstep*

Ishida starts with his favourite joseki, the taisha (Black 7), but Michael chooses a peaceful variation with 12.

White 30. Ishida Akira: 'I'd prefer to counter moyo with moyo by blocking Black's path with 'a'. Black lives in sente when he invades at 31. If White tries to kill him, he links up along the edge after squeezing with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.'

The result to 45 puts Black in the lead, but then he spoils it with a mistake in strategy. Explaining why he deserted his invading stone, Ishida commented: 'I just had a change of mind. I should have escaped by jumping out at 'e' instead of 49. Even more to the point, I should have omitted the invasion altogether, simply taking up position with 47 at 49.'

When White descends at 50, it becomes hard for Black to do anything with his solitary stone. White has now got a fat moyo on the left side: he's back in the game.

Figure 2 (51-100). *A missed opportunity*

A problem arises with 62. This is White's chance to map out a grand strategy. Ishida Akira: 'How about playing around 1 in *Dia. 1*, using the stone at the centre top as a decoy? If Black caps

at 2, then White could continue with 3 to 5, expanding his centre. This sequence, threatening to swallow up the black stone on the left side, would give White a very promising game.'





Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 1: a grand strategy

Michael does his best to settle his group with 62; territorially this is a tight move, but it doesn't hurt Ishida at all. On the contrary, it just makes Black look good, giving him the chance to unleash strong attacking moves such as 73 and 87. He is able to engineer a double attack on the white groups at the top and on the right side.

Figure 3 (101-149). The clincher

When Black cuts through the middle with 7 and 9, his double attack turns into a triple attack. The game seems to be over. However, perhaps because he has so many good moves to choose from, Ishida goes astray.




Figure 3 (101-149)

Black 25. Ishida Akira: 'Instead of 25, securing the capture of the group at the bottom with 'a' would have made Black's lead more definite. Ishida was probably worried about the possibility of White's playing a ko with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but Black would have been unlikely to lose this ko fight.'

Black sets out to capture the white group at the top, but White lives with 28 to 32. If Black has to add a stone at 33 to forestall the threat of White 'b', then in effect White has lived in sente. When White switches to 34, getting life for the group at the bottom as well, Black's attack seems to have backfired.

Often a player loses his cool after a setback like this, but not Ishida. He is aiming at the tesuji of 49, which clinches the game. White has no way of capturing both 49 and the other black stone here, so Black is able to break open his side area.

Figure 4 (150-193). (Next page)

Michael played on, but he didn't get another chance to upset Ishida's lead.

Moves 194 to 267 omitted. Black wins by 4 1/2 points.

Prize Money

1st place: ¥4,000,000 (about \$28,000)

2nd place: ¥1,300,000

3rd place: ¥600,000; 4th place: ¥400,000

(The prize money for 1st place has been increased by ¥1,000,000 from last year.)




Figure 4 (150-193)
ko: 76, 81, 86, 91; 93: connects




Figure 1 (1-50)

Cho Chikun v. Tozawa

The second game we will look at is one with a lot of action. Cho Chikun was playing in this tournament for the first time and naturally he was one of the favourites. Having just taken the Honinbo title from Takemiya, he was the top-ranked competitor; he is not generally thought of as a haya-go star, but actually the records show that he is the only player besides Otake to have won all four of the current TV tournaments (NHK, Kakusei, NEC, Haya-go Championship).

His opponent, Tozawa Akinobu, is a member of that large group of 9-dans who are solid players but have never had the luck to win a title. He has won two *Kido* prizes, for best winning percentage and most successive wins, both in 1974. In recent years he has made a number of instruction tours of Eastern Europe. In this game Tozawa lets Cho take an early lead, then does a demolition job on his moyo.

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan

Played on 29 July 1989.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). Cho takes the initiative

Ishida: 'Black 43 is uninspired. Instead, expanding Black's top moyo with a shoulder hit at 'a' looks good. Or Black could play 'b' in sente, then take up position with 'c'. Because of Black's slow move at 43, White is able to make an effective reduction at the top with 44 on.'




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A fighting furikawari

To wrest back the initiative, Black throws strong counterpunches with 57 and 59. The furikawari (trade) to 77 that follows looks natural. Black builds thickness and White takes territory. Both sides are probably satisfied with the result of this fight, but — Ishida: 'Black has fought well, but White is dictating the pace. Instead of 81, I'd prefer the high move at 'a'.'

White 96. White seems to be wrapping up the game, but this is an overplay (it might even be the losing move). White 'b' instead would have maintained a small lead. White 96 gives Black the chance to make a furious attack.




Figure 3 (101-137)

Figure 3 (101-137). Cutting the moyo in half

Black 1 and 3 were a fierce challenge. Cho was already in byo-yomi, so there was a lot of pressure on him as he tried to salvage as much as he could of his moyo. He cut off a stone up to 16, but he may have overlooked Black's strong move at 19. Helping White to push through the narrow opening with 20 is usually bad style — because White is in effect splitting two adjacent black positions — but when Black pokes his head out at 21, he has turned the tables on his attacker.



Tozawa 9-dan

Black 25 and 27 are very aggressive. Even though White extends to 28, he can't get a ladder. Black is confident he can look after his centre group.




Figure 4 (138-169)

Figure 4 (138-169). Success on both fronts for Black

Up to 45, Black's aggressive strategy is rewarded with success. He has made a big reduction to the right-side moyo and has also taken profit on the bottom left. Compare this position with that after White 96 in Figure 2: White has gained nothing with the moves he's played in this figure and Figure 3. Ishida: 'The sheer power of Tozawa's play is impressive.'

When he played 69, Black was clearly ahead. After this White made a great effort to close the gap, but he couldn't quite manage it. Tozawa owed his victory to his sharpness in seizing his opportunity the instant it was presented to him.

Moves after 169 omitted. Black wins by half a point.

('Go Weekly', 15 and 22 August 1989.)

Correction

In the news report on the Meijin league in GW55 (page 6), we referred to Awaji as a 'two-time Honinbo challenger', but this was a slip. Awaji challenged just once for the Honinbo title, in 1984. He lost 1-4 to Rin Kaiho.

The 13th Kisei Title Match

Another Triumph for Kobayashi



The top two Japanese title-holders, Kobayashi Koichi (Kisei & Meijin) and Takemiya Masaki (Honinbo), in New York ready to start their Kisei title clash. Takemiya is also the Fujitsu World Champion, so this match featured the world's number one versus the Japanese number one. The photo, of course, is a 'posed' one for the benefit of the go press; the two are not friends and the only time they talk to each other is when reviewing a game they've played.

Prior to this match, these two had played 43 games against each other, the honours being fairly even, with Kobayashi having won 23 games to Takemiya's 21. However, title matches between the two were a different story, with Kobayashi having won the 1986 Judan title 3-0 and the 1987 Kisei title 4-1. To counter this Takemiya had two lesser triumphs: defeating Kobayashi 2-1 in the 1984 Kisei playoff and in the 1985 Honinbo league playoff.

It's surprising how completely different a series can turn out from what everyone expects. Before this year's Kisei title match, there were a lot of reasons to think that Takemiya had an excellent chance of taking the title, but the upshot was a loss by the same margin as in his previous

challenge to Kobayashi in 1987.

The main reason for thinking that Takemiya would do well was that he seemed to have acquired an ascendancy over Kobayashi in the previous half year. After beating him in the 1st Fujitsu Cup (see GW53), Takemiya also scored wins in the Tengen semifinal, the Oza final, and the NEC Cup, giving him four wins in a row. The important point is that these were all solid, convincing wins, so Takemiya seemed to have taken his rival's measure.

Takemiya was also in peak form going into the title match. In the Kisei playoff he dropped the first game to Cho, but then came back with two brilliant wins. Fujisawa Shuko lavishly praised his play with white in the second and third games. Takemiya is famous for his sanren-sei with black, but actually his niren-sei (two star-point stones in a row) is, if anything, held in higher esteem by professionals. Towards the end of last year Takemiya commented that the way he was winning he felt he should be giving the opponent a handicap.

Against Kobayashi, however, things are different. Takemiya has never done very well against either Cho or Kobayashi, both of whom are strongly territory-oriented players, but he seems to feel a particular antipathy towards Kobayashi; apparently it is as much a personality clash as a question of incompatible go styles. Something about Kobayashi irritates Takemiya and he seems to let this stop him from concentrating on what's happening on the board. Sakata was probably referring to this factor when he said before the match that the key to the series would be Takemiya's state of mind, whether he could maintain his composure. In 1987, when he made his previous challenge, Takemiya made a series of insulting comments at functions connected with the title match (see our Kisei report in GW49); this time he behaved himself better, but it didn't help his play, for once again he showed lapses in concentration. Takemiya's cheerful, relaxed manner off the board disguises the fact that at the board he has superb concentration. For some reason, he can't put it all together when playing Kobayashi; this was particularly apparent in the third to fifth games, as we will point out in our commentaries.

(Continued on page 32)

Takemiya v. Kobayashi

Every year the Yomiuri newspaper invites three top players to discuss the title match and to make their predictions about how it will go. This year the gazers at the crystal ball were Sakata Eio, Ishida Yoshio, and Kato Masao. Below is the main part of their discussion.

Kato: The content of Takemiya's recent games is good. Previously, in games with Kobayashi he was prevented from playing his natural style, but recently he's been playing the real Takemiya style. As for Kobayashi, I've recently suffered a thrashing at his hands [losing the 1988 Meijin title match 1-4], so I can't say anything. At any rate, he's been playing his natural style, the Kobayashi style, if you want to call it that.

Ishida: If you look at clashes between the two, the first title match was the Judan title three years ago. Until then, Takemiya hadn't recognized Kobayashi's go. Of course, even now he mightn't recognize it . . . On that occasion he lost three straight. Then in 1987 he was all psyched up for revenge in the Kisei title, but once again he was crushed. He must have been boiling with rage inside. But last year he beat Kobayashi in various tournaments, so he probably already half thinks of himself as Kisei.

Sakata: I think Takemiya's psychological state will have a big effect on the match. In the Kisei playoff with Cho he made light of his opponent. His play was free and unfettered. Will he be able to maintain his ordinary state of mind? The outcome will be decided by this.

Kato: Their personalities are different, their go styles are different . . . At one time the leading rivals among the young players were considered to be Kobayashi and Cho, but the real rivals are Kobayashi and Takemiya. Takemiya can hardly afford to lose after the way he's been shooting off his mouth, so he'll probably fight as if his life depends on it.

Ishida: It's all very well to muster your fighting spirit, but if you become too emotional you can't play with composure. He probably won't say much this time. The less he says, the more seriously he'll be able to play.

Sakata: Whatever happens, I don't think it'll be one-sided this time. They'll take turns winning and at the least the series will go to six games.

Kobayashi has been losing to Takemiya recently, but he's a zealous student, so he will have worked out why he lost.

Kato: In Cho's case, he lets Takemiya surround as much area as he likes, then he jumps right inside. Kobayashi, on the other hand, either stops Takemiya from enclosing area right from the start or he starts reducing early. This kind of give-and-take will be interesting.

Ishida: With Takemiya's game, the issue is settled in the middle game — it's rarely held over for the endgame. So he just has to play ordinary endgame: there's no need for him to do anything really special. With Kobayashi the decisive part of the game perhaps comes in the transition from the middle game to the endgame. If he gets a bit of a lead in the middle game, he's very good at wrapping up the game. I think he's a little stronger than Takemiya in half-pointers.

Sakata: I agree with you completely.

Kato: In games between these two I don't think you often see upsets at the end of the game. When they reach the endgame, one side has a lead and usually wraps the game up.

Ishida: Takemiya's never won an overseas game. He's saying that he expects to lose the first game in New York. If he were to win the series, he'd probably drop one more game among his four wins, so in that case his winning score would be 4-2. If he were to lose the series, I have the feeling he'll lose badly, with something like 1-4.

Kisei Title Winners

1st Kisei (1977). Fujisawa Shuko defeated Hashimoto Utau 4-1.

2 (1978). Shuko d. Kato 4-3.

3 (1979). Shuko d. Ishida Yoshio 4-1.

4 (1980). Shuko d. Rin Kaiho 4-1.

5 (1981). Shuko d. Otake 4-0.

6 (1982). Shuko d. Rin 4-3.

7 (1983). Cho Chikun d. Shuko 4-3.

8 (1984). Cho d. Rin 4-2.

9 (1985). Cho d. Takemiya 4-3.

10 (1986). Kobayashi Koichi d. Cho 4-2.

11 (1987). Kobayashi d. Takemiya 4-1.

12 (1988). Kobayashi d. Kato 4-1.

13 (1989). Kobayashi d. Takemiya 4-1.

This series makes it clear that Takemiya can't hope to beat Kobayashi unless he is prepared to show him some respect and admit that the 'cosmic' style is not the only way of playing go. As for Kobayashi, he always behaves like a perfect gentleman, never letting himself be upset by Takemiya's taunts. He keeps his answers for the go board and here he has had the better of it. He has now won the Kisei title four years in a row; one more successful defence and he will join Shuko by earning the lifetime title of Honorary Kisei.

Game One

The first game of the title match was played in New York. This was the fourth time the Kisei title had gone overseas to stage a game, and these two players have each played in three of them. Overseas games to date are:

9th Kisei (1985), Game 1: Cho Kisei beat Takemiya in Seoul.

11th Kisei (1987), Game 1: Kobayashi Kisei beat Takemiya in Los Angeles.

12th Kisei (1988), Game 1: Kobayashi Kisei beat Kato in Honolulu.

13th Kisei (1989), Game 1: Takemiya beat Kobayashi Kisei in New York.

Besides these games, Takemiya had also played and lost the first game of the 1988 Honinbo title in Paris, so going into this match he had a record of three losses in three overseas games. For that reason, he didn't really expect to win the opening game in New York this year. Before leaving Japan he commented: 'I really enjoy myself when I go overseas because I can meet a lot of new people. I become friends immediately even with people I've just met. Playing a title game overseas is a contribution to popularizing go. Naturally I will lose the opening game in New York. The series will really start with the second game. I expect to take the match 4-2. If by chance I were to win in New York 4-0 is possible.'

The self-confidence was typical of Takemiya, but ironically the result was the reverse of his prediction.

One last comment before we look at the game. Sakata expected a good series because of the age of the players: Kobayashi 36, Takemiya 38. He commented that go players reach their peak in their 30s; he claims that this applied to himself too: even though he didn't win the Honinbo title until he was 41, he says that he was

strongest in his 30s. Kobayashi is the same age as Nie Weiping and Cho Hun-hyun. Actually, Kobayashi is one of the youngest players in the group that has dominated the top titles in the 80s and even the youngest player, Cho Chikun, is already 33. Perhaps the 1970s, in which players in their 20s took the top titles, were an aberration; certainly there have appeared no successors in Japan to the powerful group of Kitani disciples who have monopolized the titles in the last two decades.

White: Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in New York on 18, 19 January 1989.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-34)



Dia. 1: good for Black


Figure 1 (1-34). Takemiya's good start

Usually the players start a best-of-seven by feeling each other out, exchanging jabs rather than slugging it out, but in this game Kobayashi launches a challenge immediately with 11. Rin dubbed this fight 'the New York duel'.

White 14 makes good shape: White is prepared to sacrifice 8 and 10 if necessary. White 14 at 'a' would be heavy.


White 18. A light move which shows that Takemiya was in great form for this game. Dragging the two stones out with 1 in *Dia. 1* would give Black a good attack with 2 and 4. Living small at the bottom would not be interesting for White, but playing 3 at A would let Black attack the corner with B.

When Black counters with 19, his aim is to swallow up the two white stones to the right. Answering with 1 in *Dia. 2* would be just what Black wants. White's left-side moyo is not as big as it looks — for a start, there's a weak point at 'a'. Black gets quite a big area at the bottom. White does have the aji of 'b', but if Black gets to play 'c' first, he secures a big territory. Countering with 20 in the figure is therefore natural.



Dia. 2: good for Black

Black 27 is an excellent move, but played at the wrong time. After the game Kobayashi regretted not pushing up at 29 first; the reason is that he assumed that 29 would be sente at any time, but Takemiya surprised him by switching to 32, after a clever forcing move at 30.



Dia. 3: correct timing

Dia. 3. If Black plays 1 first, White will answer at 2, so Black can now play 3. After 4, Black could give up the two stones, forcing with 5 before switching to the top right with 'b' in the figure. If Black expanded his right side like this, he could afford to give the centre to White.

Kisei Prize Money

1st: ¥30,000,000 (about \$210,000)

2nd: ¥6,000,000


Match fee — title-holder: ¥8,000,000

challenger: ¥5,000,000


Playoff fee — winner: ¥2,900,000

loser: ¥900,000

White 30 is perfectly timed. The exchange for 31 makes it possible for White to switch to 32. If Black pulls out his stone with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 4*, the counter of 6 works well. If Black 7 and 9 —




Dia. 4



Dia. 5: White wins

Dia. 5. White continues with 1 through 11 and easily wins the corner fight.

Instead of 7 in *Dia. 4* —



Dia. 6: trouble for Black

Dia. 6. If 7 here, White makes good shape with 8. Black is now at a loss: his corner group doesn't have eyes, White threatens to capture his outside stones with A, and White also has B.

Kobayashi therefore answers patiently with 33. This threatens to link up by attaching at 'c', so White forestalls that with 34.



Trying to warm up with an unscheduled sumo match in Central Park. Takemiya is outweighed by Rin, but Izumitani 6-dan v. Fujii Masayoshi (head of the Yomiuri go section) looks like a more even match.





Figure 2 (35-70)
63: connects

Figure 2 (35-60). Centre thickness

After playing 36, Takemiya left the playing room and looked in at the pressroom on the same 11th floor of the Hotel Kitano. 'I played without thinking. The game would have been over if I'd played a hane on the outside instead of

36. I'm disgusted with myself.' Mumbling thus to himself, Takemiya laid out the sequence in *Dia. 7* on the go board on which his fellow professionals were following the game, then swept out of the room. The idea is that after Black 6, White would enclose the top left corner with 'a' in the figure. This result, in which Black is sealed into the corner, would certainly give Takemiya the kind of large-scale moyo he is fond of.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

However, Ohira Shuzo, the referee, lodged an objection. The result in *Dia. 7* is too good for White. Instead of 4 there, Black could counter with 1 in *Dia. 8*. This way Black not only pokes his head out with 3 and 5, but can also separate White with 7 to 11; after 12, Black 'a' will be sente. Black can be satisfied with the result to 15.


Black 43 is a tesuji: it gives a better result than simply blocking at 49, as that way Black 47 won't be sente after White 44. The sacrifice enables Black to force with both 47 and 49, then switch to 51.

Black 51 was the last move played before lunch. For most of the morning White had had the upper hand, but with 51 Black makes the game even.

White 52 is a good, subtle move. After 51, Black is aiming at pushing through to the right of 39 and cutting, but simply connecting there would be too artless. Instead, attaching at 52 sets up a connection between the white groups and builds centre thickness, so making the cut would now be pointless for Black.

White continues by building more thickness in the centre with 58 on. White 60 might seem to lose points, but it forces Black to cut at 61 and capture the two stones on the outside (if he omits 61, White will capture his stones with 'b'). This gives Takemiya the kind of thickness he likes, but not everyone would go along with his strategy. In a TV program on the game, Sakata commented: 'I can see that White has built Takemiya-style thickness, but it's gone. I could never play like this.'

White 70 makes use of White's centre thickness.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

Figure 3 (71–104). *Kobayashi is too cautious.*

When Black attaches at 71, the continuation to 82 is forced. The ladder is unfavourable, so Black can't switch 73 to 74: White 73, Black 76, White 75 would follow.

Instead of 79, Black could hane at 1 in *Dia. 9*, but after White 4 the threat of White 'a' would be even more severe than it is in the figure. Also, note that if White omits 82, Black kills him as in *Dia. 10*.

Black is probably a little dissatisfied with this result, as he has weak points at 'a' and 'b' that White can aim at. His outside influence is flawed.





Figure 3 (71–104)



Dia. 11: crude but keeps sente

Black 85 was criticized by Sakata, who called it the 'first step on the path to defeat'. He advocated taking sente with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 11*, then switching to 'c' in the figure. This way, Sakata maintains, Black would be unlikely to lose.


The thick hane of White 90 is a typical Takemiya move. Rin: 'I could never play this way. Takemiya disliked the prospect of Black 'd' ... at least, that's what he said, but normally you'd just extend to 92.'

However, White 90 led Kobayashi to make the losing move. Everyone connected with the game — Kobayashi himself, Takemiya, Rin, Ohira, Hashimoto Uтарo (in New York to see the game) — agreed that 91 was far too thick. It's the kind of move you play when you have a safe lead, and that's not the position here.

It can be surmised that Kobayashi didn't think 90 was much of a move and was glad to play 91 in exchange. However, he admitted later that at this stage he had erred in his assessment of the territorial balance: ever the optimist, he believed that he was ahead. However, after Takemiya took the large point of 92, Black was

Takemiya took the large point of 92, Black was locked out of the game.

Instead of 91, Black should have extended to 1 in *Dia. 12*. As one possibility, Rin gave the continuation to 21. If this sequence were played, it would put Black ten points ahead on the board. His only worry would be the thinness of his bottom left group.



Dia. 12: a small lead for Black

Black has no alternative to invading at 93, but up to 104 White secures the lead. He has greater thickness all over the board, and that outweighs the small territorial lead Black has.

Incidentally, when the players were discussing

91, Takemiya admitted that he really should have played 90 at 92 (if Black then played 'd', White could answer at 'e').




Figure 4 (105-152)

Figure 4 (105-152). *Everything goes Takemiya's way.*

Black 5 was the sealed move on the first day. This was the second-highest number of moves played in one day in a Kisei title match (the record is 115 moves in the 4th game of the 1st Kisei title match between Shuko and Hashimoto Utao). One reason for the fast play may have




Kobayashi keeps in shape by going for an hour's walk every day (in Japan he also plays tennis regularly). He got to know Manhattan quite well.

been that the time allowance was reduced from nine hours to eight this year. Also, it was suggested, jet-lag may have been a factor. Play started at what would have been 11 p.m. in Japan, so the players were sitting down for a full day's session when normally they would have been getting ready to hit the sack. Of course, they had arrived in New York four days before the game started, but one wonders whether this is really enough time to adjust completely to a different time zone.

According to the *Kido* reporter, Kobayashi looked in bad shape when he turned up for the second day's play. On the first day he had laboured under the illusion that the game was favourable for him; the reporter conjectured that perhaps he had woken up to his mistake and as a consequence spent a sleepless night.

Black 7 makes the deficit irretrievable. Black might have been able to stave off defeat longer if he had played 7 at 'a', forestalling White 12; at least he could have made a fight of it in the endgame.

White 12 is a standard tesuji but very severe nonetheless. By taking away Black's base, White forces him to seek eye shape at the bottom with moves that just help White to pull out his two captured stones. After 24, Black is behind on the board. Note that resisting White 12 with 1 in *Dia. 13* would let White cut off two stones and secure an enormous centre.




Dia. 13: even better for White

Black 25 and 27 are Black's last challenge. White could simply give way with 32 at 'b' and win comfortably, but Takemiya is not in the

mood for compromise. Likewise with 40: White could win by compromising with 1 in *Dia. 14*, but he welcomes the fight. If you start off a title match by giving the opponent a thorough thrashing, you may be able to establish an ascendancy over him.

A large ko fight follows.



Dia. 14: good enough for White




Figure 5 (153-228)

ko: 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 76;
84: ko (at 64); 87: ko (at 81)

Figure 5 (153-228). *A masterful start by Takemiya*

White has too many ko threats against the black group on the left. He finishes off the ko with 78, letting the fight shift to a ko in the top right corner. He then trades this group for the black group on the top left. Even though this

gives Black sente to capture at 91, White is well ahead on the board (perhaps eight points when Black resigns).

This was a superb start to the series for Takemiya and a good example of his brilliant use of thickness with white. He now had five wins in a row against Kobayashi, who must have been starting to get seriously worried.

Black resigns after White 228.

(Time taken. White: 6 hours.

Black: 6 hours 36 minutes.)



Takemiya surprised himself by winning the opening game in New York. He beat Kobayashi in such convincing fashion that he must already have been seeing himself as Kisei.

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played in Nagasaki on 1, 2 February 1989.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

In his speech at the party held in Nagasaki the night before the second game started, Kobayashi made an ironical allusion to Takemiya's frequent taunts. Kobayashi: 'I'm constantly being encouraged by Takemiya. There's no one else kind enough to give me such direct advice, so it's a valuable stimulus for me.'

Takemiya, in his speech: 'I had scheduled a loss in New York, but Kobayashi was in bad shape. I wonder if there could be something wrong with him.'




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Kobayashi's psychological warfare*

The first interesting move is White 2. According to go etiquette, one should not play one's first move in the opponent's bottom right corner. There were various reactions to Kobayashi's solecism. Ishida: 'Playing 2 in the bottom left corner would prevent Black from playing a *tasuki fuseki* [stones in diagonally opposite corners], but playing in the bottom right corner is exactly the same as playing in the top left corner. Since they're the same, I would have preferred to see Kobayashi observe etiquette. Takemiya, being Takemiya, may well have lost his temper over this move.'

After the game Takemiya pointed to 2 and asked Kobayashi: 'Why did you play here?' Kobayashi: 'I just wanted to try something different.'

Konishi Taizo 6-dan, writing in *Kido*, had an interesting interpretation. The go board is not a perfect square — the length is a fraction greater than the width — so making Takemiya set up his *sanren-sei* sideways may have made it feel smaller. This may be reading too much into Kobayashi's move, but the main point is that preventing Takemiya from playing his accustomed vertical *sanren-sei* struck Konishi as a manifestation of fighting spirit. For his part,


Takemiya probably took it as a petty provocation.

This is not the first time a player has played White 2 in this corner. Just to take some recent examples, Sonoda played it against Kobayashi in the 1986 Tengen title match and Cho played it against Takemiya in the 7th game of the 1985 Kisei title match, making Takemiya set up his sanren-sei along the top, as in this game. In short, this rule of etiquette applies more strongly to Black's first move than to White's. (There is no record that Takemiya objected when Cho did it.)


To go on with the game: Black 11 is an important move. If Black played at 'a', White would attach at 11 and flatten out his moyo.

White 14 shows that for Kobayashi the white sanren-sei is a kind of decoy; if he were interested in a moyo contest, he would do something like jump to 'b' on the top right. As pointed out by Kato (page 31), Kobayashi likes to shoot down a moyo before it gets off the ground.

Black 17 and 19 look very formidable, but this is a risky way to play. Black is gambling that if White invades the left side, he'll be able to kill him: he's putting all his eggs in one basket. *Dia. 1* shows a more conventional strategy. Black 1 forces White out, so Black takes territory more securely with 3.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 26. This kind of tenuki is definitely not in the textbooks, but Kobayashi is more concerned with the moyo above than territory below. Securing the white group at the top is the premise for invading the left side with 28: it eliminates the possibility of Black's making a double attack on the invader and the group at the top.


Black 29 is the only move; if Black descended at 50 instead, White would extend towards the top and probably have no trouble settling himself.

White 34 is a light move. Attaching at 1 in *Dia. 2* would be greedy; after Black 2, it's very hard to say if White can live on the side.


Black 35 is the natural follow-up to 27, but Takemiya very much regretted continuing with 41. Takemiya: 'I was a fool. White has already submitted by attaching underneath at 40, so I should have been satisfied with that. I had to attack on the left side with 1 in *Dia. 3*.'

White 40 is the kind of move a professional is reluctant to play. Up to 46 White is forced to make a painful shape. However, moving out into the centre with 'c' would be counterproductive when White has the weak group above.

Takemiya probably felt grateful for 40; he played 41 to 45 immediately, followed by the hane at 47. Ishida: 'Black 41 to 47 may feel good, but they take no substance. If Black used 41 to attach at 1 in *Dia. 3*, the sequence to 7 would follow. The question of whether White can now live on the side is an ultra-difficult life and death problem. It would be a disaster for White if he launched on this sequence at once and were captured, so he would probably keep 2 on in reserve. Instead, he might take territory by running into Black with A and wait for the right time to do something on the left side. White A would secure quite a handsome territory from the bottom to the right. Takemiya said that even with 47 he should have played 1 in this diagram. Black 47 is one of Takemiya's inimitable slack moves.'



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

'Slack' is the reverse side of the coin to 'thick'; in this case, taking gote is painful.

After 20 minutes thought Kobayashi attached at 48, which was a very shrewd move. He must have been relieved at getting the chance to reinforce here.

Black 49 is the only move; if at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White makes good shape with 2 and 4. Black 49

was the last move before lunch. Up to this point Takemiya had used only 37 minutes of his time, to Kobayashi's two hours four minutes; after lunch Takemiya played his next nine moves in two minutes before finally slowing down a little. Watching him on the TV monitor, Ishida and Kato (the referee) had been worried about the speed with which he was playing, as usually he is a deliberate player who spends a lot of time working out his fuseki strategy. The fact that he spent no time on key moves testified to his poor concentration.




Figure 2 (51-82)
59: connects

Figure 2 (51-82). Black's options reduced

Black 51-White 62. Ishida: 'Kobayashi's made a resolute decision here. This was Black's strongest position to start out with, so he figures it doesn't matter how much he strengthens him further. When White fixes up his shape with 66, he has a promising game.' The black position on the left is a little overconcentrated and Black can no longer hope to make a severe attack on the white group here. White has taken a bit of a lead.

Black 63 was another move Takemiya spent no time on. It looked like the proper move, as it prevented White from pushing along and cutting, but after the game Takemiya lamented, tearing his hair as he spoke, 'I was stark raving mad when I played this move.'

The game is not going well for Black, so he should leave this area unsettled and instead expand the battle front by invading at 67 immediately. Depending on what happens, it might

be more effective for Black to play 'a' rather than 63.

Black 67. With the centre settled, it is easier for Kobayashi to decide how to handle this invasion. He could counter 67 by peeping at 'b', but Black might ignore that and jump to 75; as he is ahead, White has no need to increase the scale of the fighting. The ordinary-looking counter of 68 to 74 works surprisingly well for White: he goes for territory, confident that Black's thickness from the ponnuki on the outside won't amount to anything.

For once Takemiya thought a little, taking 20 minutes to play 77. The only thing left for Black to do is to attack the white group on the left, but doing so directly doesn't look as if it will lead anywhere, so he starts with a diversionary attack at the top.

Black 81 is an interesting move. If White rushes to make the double atari to the right of 81, Black will counter-atari at 'c', enabling him to pick up two stones at the top with 'd'.





Figure 3 (83-100)

Figure 3 (83-100). Black's attack fizzles out.

The aim of 83 is to take sente. After 85, White 86 is necessary. Black then strikes at the shoulder of the white group with 87. Everyone following the game agreed that this was the only point for attacking White.


White 94 is a clever move. White's position may seem to be full of holes, but if Black tries to cut, that is, with Black 96, White A, Black B, then he has no answer to White C because of his shortage of liberties.

Black 95 threatened to push through at 96 and also set up a big capture at D, but Kato Masao suggested that Black would have had more of a chance if he had captured at 1 in *Dia.* 5. At least this way Black would have been able to keep the white groups separated. After 7 White would have at 'a' and be in no danger, but Black would be left with the cut at 'b'. (If White omits 2, Black attaches at 'c' and cuts him into two.)



Dia. 5: Black's last chance

When White links up solidly with 96 and 98, there is no longer any scope for Black to stage an upset. Moreover, the thickness White builds with 96 threatens the black group to the right, so Black has to reinforce with 99.






Figure 6 (201-224)

Figures 5, 6. The turning point of the series

This game finished at 14:54, which is quite early for a two-day game. In the first game, which had finished at a similar time, 14:45, the players had used approximately the same amount of time, but this time there was a big gap. Even though Takemiya slowed down in the second half of the game, he used only half his time allowance, whereas Kobayashi went into byo-yomi. Like the first game, however, the issue was more or less decided on the first day.

Kobayashi put an end to his losing streak against Takemiya in very decisive fashion. After the series ended, he commented that he was under the most pressure in this game but also that he thought it was his best performance of the series. Forcing Takemiya to shift his sanren-sei was certainly a success.

If the game were played out, apparently White would win by 3 1/2 points.

Black resigns after White 224.

(Time taken. White: 7 hours 52 minutes.

Black: 4 hours 5 minutes.)

Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 8, 9 February in Gifu City.

Commentary dictated by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). *When the cosmic style starts worrying about the corners . . .*

It's one of the seven wonders of modern go.

Why is Takemiya so uninspired when he plays Kobayashi? Or rather, why, in spite of the fact that their career results are almost even, is Takemiya so strangely uninspired in their title clashes?

It's really a mystery. What's going on?

This game is also very funny. I can't believe it's Takemiya playing. Perhaps the truth is that Koichi has thoroughly researched the Takemiya style and is strategically outplaying him.

Takemiya always plays the high approach move of 6 here. Now pay attention to the moves from 7 to 15. You can now see why Black simply extended to 5.





Figure 1 (1-50)




Dia. 1: the superseded Kobayashi pattern

Dia. 1. Previously the Kobayashi style was to play 1 and 3. Assuming the same sequence as in the game follows up to 13, then it would be better not to have the 1-2 exchange on the board. Instead of 1, Black leaves open the option of

making an approach move at 'a'. This is Koichi's innovation.

Takemiya plays the moves to 14 without hesitation, then invades at 16. Once again we now see the distinctive Kobayashi style come into play. Namely, the three moves of 17, 19, and 23. Otake has commented: 'Kobayashi will attack groups that ordinary players think can't be attacked.' I too would never dream of attacking this solid white group with moves like 19 and 23. White can play 24 and 26 in sente, so 23 is too close to the group it's attacking. It feels funny.

Dia. 2. Instead of attacking with the two large knight moves, the conventional idea would be to jump to 1, and it seems to me that this is superior. Black 'a' next would be severe, so White will play 2 and 4 as in the game. Black can then switch to the top with 5 and 7.



Dia. 2: a more conventional strategy

Black 19 and 23 struck me as thin: they leave gaps behind. Of course, Koichi was perfectly well aware of this.


Koichi was full of fighting spirit in this game. After opening with a new fuseki strategy, he presses White hard with moves that come close to being overplays. I can't believe that Takemiya was overwhelmed by his aggressiveness, but his play here becomes quite funny.

White pokes his head out with 24 and 26, looking forward to the counterattack with 38 to 42. This is OK, but I have my doubts about his manoeuvre with 28 on. Takemiya didn't use to be the kind of player who would fiddle around like this. I think that White would have much more to look forward to in this game if he did nothing here and played 38 to 42 immediately.

White 28 to 34 aim next at 46 and 48, but in

my opinion it's not like Takemiya to concern himself with a move like 46, though I admit that 48 takes a lot of profit. He's not the kind of player you expect to see fussing around in a corner like this. Not Takemiya.

White 46 is the losing move. White must repair his centre defences with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* and aim at attacking. White should have either followed this diagram or played 28 at 38, as mentioned above.



Dia. 3: the centre is more important

White takes corner profit with 48, Black takes control of the centre with 47 and 49 — and the game is over. 'Terrible' — that's all you can say. That's not just me — ten professionals out of ten would make the same comment.

White's position is already irretrievably lost. Then, when you remember that his opponent is the number one player at wrapping up a won game...



What's happened to the cosmic style?



Takemiya enjoys a joke with Iwata 9-dan and Hane 9-dan. He doesn't seem too upset by his loss.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 2 (51–100). *Things don't get any better.*

Black has established a lead at a very early stage. Hereafter, he just tries to simplify and wind up the game. White has to try to keep the game as open and complicated as possible.

Black 55 is no longer purely a defensive move; because the centre black group has become so strong, this move threatens to exploit White's thinness in the centre.

White can't block at 71 with 58. The fight after Black cuts at 75 would be unreasonable for him. That means that he has to drop back to 58, but once you start playing moves like this you fall way behind on territory.

White 70 is awful: it ends up becoming a superfluous stone. I wonder why Takemiya played here. You'd expect Takemiya — or any player, for that matter — to cap with White 73. That would force Black to link up with 'a', so White could switch to the large point of White 89 at the bottom. This might make the game a little closer.

White 74. If at 'b', Black jumps to 'c'. White's positions are too thin for him to mount an effective attack.

The exchange of 77 for 78 settles the issue.

Figure 3 (101–195). *A one-sided win*

A ko fight breaks out at the bottom left, but Black only needs to take a little profit with his ko threat. At the end he is more than 15 points ahead on the board.

Kobayashi's forte is positions that one can analyse. Takemiya's forte is positions that defy analysis. The greater the element of the unknown in a game, the more favourable it is for Takemiya; the smaller that element, the better for Kobayashi. In that respect, Koichi has held the initiative in this year's Kisei series. He has cleverly set up positions in which he can read out everything. Takemiya has found his possibilities eliminated. The Kobayashi style is becoming even more polished.

White resigns after Black 195.

(Time taken. White: 3 hours 26 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 37 minutes.)

(Adapted from 'Kido', April 1989).




Figure 3 (101-195)

26: ko (at 16); 28: connects;

42: ko (below 29); 45: ko

Game Four

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played at Ikaho hot spring on 22, 23 February 1989. Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.

When I gave a commentary on the Kisei playoff for *Kido*, I stated that Takemiya's go was like a picture. This doesn't apply just to Takemiya — there are times when Kobayashi's and Cho's games are like a picture, but I think that the frequency is quite different. So I was looking forward very much to seeing what kind of pictures Takemiya would show us in the title match itself, but my expectations have been

betrayed. The first game was so-so, but the second and third games were hopeless. You couldn't help wondering if they were really Takemiya games.

Even so, I expected the fourth game to be the decisive one. If Takemiya made a fresh start and drew a beautiful picture, the flow of the series might change and we might still witness an epic clash representing the peak of contemporary go.

It was with this feeling of anticipation that I undertook, for the first time in a long while, the job of referee, enabling me to observe Takemiya's go close up. Once again I was betrayed.

As Otake has observed, the fascination of Takemiya's go is an unlimited vastness, yet here he was shrinking up within himself and making the go board small. He claimed that he wasn't paying more attention to his opponent than to the board, but I wonder.

I can't muster up much enthusiasm for a commentary, but I will try to give my own interpretation of the fourth game.





Figure 1 (1-14)

Figure 1 (1-14). The value of tengen

As always, the sanren-sei. You might think the sanren-sei keeps the game simple, but that's not so, which is why go is so difficult. Occupying the tengen (centre point) instead of 11 also looks good, and instead of 13 Black could consider *Dia. 1* (next page). In this case, the consensus is that White 2 is better than White 'a' [if White 'a', Black is left with the option of invading at the 3-3 point].



Dia. 1

Of course, Black 13 is also a splendid move. It's a kosumi with good aji. It is a little slow-paced, though, so Black has to be prepared to cede the centre point to White. The value of 14 becomes the focus of the opening fight.

Apparently some people commented that going by their styles it was as if the players had reversed colours, but I can't go along with that.





Figure 2 (15-50)

Figure 2 (15-50). *Mortally wounded in the opening*

The approach move of 15: it's the conventional move and there are no possible grounds for criticizing it. But Takemiya commented that he should have played at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black makes White answer at 2, then forces once more with 3. If he then invades at 5, followed by the joseki to


16, the effectiveness of 1 and 3 is obvious. If he invaded the corner first, then later tried to force with 1, it's hardly likely White would answer at 2; instead, he'd go for a big centre with White 3. That's the difference. I too always feel tempted to make moves like 1 or, when I was playing Nie, 'a' [GW55, p. 34], but will White answer? It's a very perplexing problem.



Dia. 2


Once Black makes the approach move, the sequence to 19 is natural; at this point White 20 is severe. Kobayashi probably considered that jumping to 'a' would have been slack.

I was very interested to see Takemiya's next move. The *tokkuri* ['sake bottle': the nickname for the shape made by 17, 19, and 21 — it's usually considered an inefficient shape] of 21. Since Takemiya played it, I thought that it must be good, but one can't necessarily claim that it's the best move. Letting White solidly block Black's path out with 22 is depressing, so I think Black could have tried the handicap-go-style move of 1 in *Dia. 3*. It's obvious that Black will take the vital point of 2, but Black could patiently block at 3. This would be a reasonable game. Another straightforward option would be to follow *Dia. 4*.




Dia. 3

Black 23 and 25: what is a player like Takemiya doing playing moves like these? The moment I saw them I lost all interest in seeing the rest of the game. Why does he have to shrivel up like this? It's no longer a Takemiya game.




Dia. 4

‘I was surprised — and grateful,’ said Kobayashi. There’s no reason why Takemiya should be trying to make his opponent happy. Poking his head out with 1 in *Dia. 5* is the only move. If White 2, he peeps at 3. If White counterattacks with 4, Black can be satisfied with 5 and 7. The centre black stone (3) looks stupid, but the marked white stone has also rotted away, so it’s a close contest. I’d much prefer to break through the gap than to bow my head and grovel for life.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

We would be justified in labeling 23 and 25 the losing moves. That’s how rigorous go is. In fact, there’s not one interesting development for Black after this.

To supplement my earlier comment: White may perhaps connect at 4 in *Dia. 6*. Black can force with 5, then attach at 7. If next White ‘a’, then Black ‘b’; if instead White ‘c’, then Black ‘d’. If Black just pokes his head out, then he has plenty to look forward to, starting with an invasion at the 3–3 point in the bottom left.


‘I thought that if I lived up to 29, the white stone on the centre point would become irrelevant,’ was Takemiya’s explanation later. This comment is evidence that Takemiya is not in form. The centre stone is definitely not irrelevant,

while strengthening White like this is a major offence. This superficial analysis is not like Takemiya.


To be frank, I don’t have any inclination to comment on the rest of the game. No matter who did it, he’d come to the same conclusions, so I’ll just quickly go through the moves.

White 30 is the right point for an invasion. The problem comes up with White 34. Both players thought that 35 was natural, but I find this hard to understand. It’s much too easygoing — doesn’t Black have to block on one side or the other?


Dia. 7. Black 1 might be dubious, as White uses the cut of 2 to settle his group. Black is left with a weak group to the left.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Dia. 8. I think that blocking at 1 is correct. Black goes for territory with 5, defying White to attack his group. Kobayashi said confidently that he planned to play 6 to 10, but can we believe him? Black can stop him from linking up with 3 in *Dia. 9* and should be able to handle the fight. If White cuts with 4, Black plays 5 and 7. Even if White cuts at ‘a’, he can’t catch these stones, so White will have more to fear than Black. If White simply plays 2 at 4, a trade follows with Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black 6. Black could be satisfied with this.

Forcing with 36 is a pragmatic move. If White plays 38 immediately, Black ‘b’ will be annoying; with 36 on the board, White answers Black ‘b’ with ‘c’ and has no problems. Around this point

Kobayashi is already controlling the pace of the game. Playing obvious moves can't give him a bad result, so the game is easy for him. And he's exceptionally skilful at wrapping up games like this. Black's start was too awful.




Figure 3 (51-100)

Figure 3 (51-100). *Takemiya looking dispirited*


Black lives on the side and White lives at the top: this is a very polite game. In this result, so far from becoming irrelevant, the centre white stone only shines more brilliantly. The counterattack of White 'a' is a nasty threat. Takemiya has been blocked from playing his favourite strategy and is looking dispirited. At some point he wants to switch to counterattack, but for the time being he has to be patient.

The aim of the manoeuvre with 51 is to alleviate the threat of White 'a'.


Black 61 was the sealed move. Letting White live so easily seems too relaxed an approach. I think that Black should drive White out into the centre by descending at 1 in *Dia. 10*. If White 2, Black plays 3 and 5 and attacks solidly. Assuming White adds a move in the centre, Black can set up forcing moves with 'a' or 'b', so White won't get a definite connection. This way he will probably feel uneasy. Perhaps Black could also make miai of moves above and below by jumping out to 'c' instead of 3.

Dia. 11. Since jumping out doesn't lead anywhere, White might switch to 2 here. The continuation to 10 is just one possibility; next, Black could pick a fight by invading at 11 — of course, he has one eye on the group on the side.


This way there seems to be more scope for Black to complicate the game. Instead of 3 —




Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13


Dia. 12. Note that connecting at 1 here is not good. There's a big difference in territory when White links up with 2 to 8.

Once Black attaches at 61, there is no room for variation. Going for a trade by playing 63 at 1 in *Dia. 13* might be acceptable in a handicap game, but in an even game it's out of the question, as White gets too much territory.

I can find virtually no bad moves by Kobayashi in this game, so it's a good game for him, but one thing that does disturb me is his answer to Black's invasion at 69. Building thickness on the outside is not very effective in this position, so it seems painful to me to let Black take so much territory. This is his chance to stop fussing around and announce to Black that the game is over. The best way to do this is to play the stylish combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 14*. Black can hardly play 'a', so he will have to connect solidly at 4. White could then strengthen his base with 5 on; this way he moves steadily forward towards his goal. If I had an opponent play like this against me, I would promptly lose all will to fight. This should put White way ahead in territory.

If Kobayashi had made the judgement that playing thickly was enough to win, then there's no point my saying anything, but when Black secures territory at the bottom and in the corner, he goes a long way towards closing the gap.

Then comes 99. Takemiya had an incredible move up his sleeve here; for a moment it looked like an upset. This is the only spectacular scene in an uneventful game . . .



Dia. 14






Figure 4 (101-155)



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Figure 4 (101-155). *Takemiya's brilliancy not enough to win*

Black 3 took Kobayashi by surprise. This is a truly frightening move which makes use of the aji of the captured black stone to the right (below 22). If White ataris at 5 instead of 4, Black connects at 4 and has no trouble living.


White 8. White would like to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15*, but Black has the unanswerable combination of 4 and 6 — if White connects, Black 'a'.

White has no choice but to yield with 8, letting Black take extravagant profit with the double atari of 9. I've been harping on the lack of sparkle in Takemiya's play, but as far as this corner is concerned I take off my hat to him.

Kobayashi commented that if he had seen this tesuji coming, he would have played 100 in Figure 3 at 1 in *Dia. 16*. Black can use the placement at 4 to take quite a lot of profit here, but White 'a' will be sente, so White is thick. This way White would have maintained a comfortable lead.

Usually a local reversal of this magnitude would cause the lead to change hands, but in this game it merely serves to narrow the gap.

Kobayashi's subsequent play is flawless. First, White 10, forestalling Black 29, is a good move. Next, White 14 is a decisive point: it eliminates the only remaining source of anxiety in White's position, namely, the bad aji in White's bottom left corner. If Black were to connect with the marked stone in *Dia. 17*, he would be able to invade with 1 to 7, which leads to a ko fight.



Dia. 17




Figure 5 (156-236)
128: connects (at 63)



Going over the game with Shuko and Kudo.

Figure 5 (156–236). *Kobayashi in firm control of the match*

By the end the gap was surprisingly wide. If Black had played 57 at 58, the game would have been a little closer.

On 97 Takemiya went into byo-yomi, for the first time in the series.

Kobayashi is strong. Though he doesn't have the showiness of the Takemiya style, his steadiness puts him head and shoulders above other players. Properly speaking, I'm the one who should suppress him, but . . .

White wins by 6 1/2 points.

(Time taken. White: 7 hours 25 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 55 minutes.)

('Kido', April 1989)

Game Five

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Otaru, Hokkaido, on 1, 2 March 1989.

Ironically, the game with which Kobayashi defended the title was a masterpiece for Takemiya — at least for the first half of the game, until one unthinking move let Kobayashi turn the tables. In an interview with Igo Club, Kobayashi reviewed the highlights of the final game. We have supplemented his remarks through reference to the Yomiuri commentary. The Igo Club reporter is Akiyama Kenji.

Akiyama Kenji: Looking back on the series, the second game, after you'd lost in New York, was the key game.

Kobayashi Koichi: It was a crisis for me. I felt the most pressure in the series. But that was my best game of the match. From the fuseki through the middle game, there was not one move I regretted. If I hadn't done something funny in the endgame . . .

AK: It was a masterpiece. Speaking of masterpieces, the fourth game at Ikaho also . . .

KK: I got an easy game in the opening. To change the topic, I think that modern go has reached quite a high level. If you fall just a little behind in the opening, you can't recoup the loss.

AK: The fourth game is a good example.

KK: Yes. Once again I did something funny in the middle game, but I was saved because my initial lead was so big. Well, the fourth game is no masterpiece. I played better in the second game. My opponent hardly had a chance. If we'd played out the normal endgame, I might even have been ahead on the board.

AK: The second game changed the flow of the series.

KK: No, I don't know if you can go so far as to say that. The only thing is that it made me confident that I'd recovered. . . .

AK: Taking the series as a whole, I got an impression of boldness about your play. In each move you played and in you spiritually.

KK: Perhaps I'm getting more and more used

to the pressure each year. I can concentrate, without being distracted by what my opponent says or does . . .

AK [after speculating about who will be the challenger next year]: None of the younger players is making his mark.

KK: My opponents are senior players or players in my age group. Perhaps the reason why no younger player has emerged is that the top group is too strong. You see veteran players taking the league places [the average age of the players in the upcoming Honinbo league is 44], and look at someone like Hane, who has the strength to defeat Nie. You can't secure a permanent league place unless you break through this group.

AK: Even players like Yoda and Kataoka, Kobayashi Satoru and O Rissei have a lot of trouble getting into the leagues. The top group is certainly strong. Well, let's take a look at the 5th game.

KK: This was my worst game of the series. I was thinking that I'd have to make the trip to Toyama [where the 6th game was scheduled]. This was one of my rare upset wins.

AK: Takemiya didn't once get to play his typical large-moyo strategy. Was this because you had a counter-strategy?

KK: Calling it a counter-strategy would be exaggerated, but I did try out a few things in the fuseki. I took a lot of trouble over the timing for reducing his moyos.

Figure 1 (1–45). *Kobayashi's fuseki meets with criticism.*

Kobayashi's play in this game did not meet with much approval from his fellow professionals, beginning with his experimental move at 23. This is designed to prevent the White 2–4 combination in *Dia. 1*, but even so it seems too narrow. Most players thought that Kobayashi should have played 1 in *Dia. 1* regardless; when White plays 2 and 4, he can fight back with the moves to 11 (apparently Black 5 is considered a key move in this sequence).

Black 25 is not very good after 23, as White is happy to attach at 26 and make Black overconcentrated on the left side.

Black 43, destroying White's territory rather than merely limiting it with an extension to 'a', was described as typical of Kobayashi's style.

AK: You referred to the care you took over timing, yet your manoeuvre with 43 and 45 met

with criticism.

KK: That's right. I think that the invasion at 43 is OK. The hane at 1 in *Dia. 2* (next page) is almost irresistible, but Black ends in gote, letting White play 8, so I just couldn't bring myself to play it.






Figure 1 (1–45)




Dia. 1

AK: This way the bottom would be virtually all white territory. You can't say the bottom right is black territory.

KK: That's right. So, trying something at the bottom is natural. The problem was my extension at 45. This was too greedy. I should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 3*. I think White would probably play 2 and 4. Next, Black can extend at 5, force with 7 and 9, then switch to 1 in *Dia. 2*. This result shouldn't be bad for Black.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

AK: What if White blocks at 2 in *Dia. 4*?

KK: Someone did make this suggestion, but what if Black connects at 3? If Black lives up to 13, he gets more solid territory than in the game, and White will have trouble deciding how to defend the cutting points in his shape. Playing White 'a' would surely be out of the question. White 'b', perhaps. At this point, Black could switch to the centre hane.



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (46–100). *A brilliant attack*

AK: Black took gote with this invasion.

KK: I fell behind here. At the time I believed that the result was reasonable because 57 and 59 would be of some use to Black.

AK: You're quite the optimist.

KK: I slept soundly for eight hours after the first day's play. That wouldn't have happened if I'd realized I was doing badly.




Figure 2 (46–100)

AK: An incurable optimist. (laughter) Takemiya was also optimistic about his position.

KK: This is the kind of game he's good at. His forte, above all else, is playing solidly with white and winning with the komi.

AK: Otake was saying the same thing. This is a bit difficult for an amateur to understand. We feel that the real Takemiya style is building a large moyo with black.

KK: I don't think he's so good at moyo games. I think you'll find his winning percentage with white is higher.

AK: There's a big difference between being a spectator and actually playing. You're not afraid of Takemiya's large-moyo strategy?

KK: I didn't say that. Large-moyo games are also difficult, and it's difficult too when the opponent plays solidly as in this game. Either way, the issue is not easily settled. Very subtle points decide the game. Like here.


With 62 to 70, Takemiya followed a consistent policy of attacking the black group here. At this stage he was probably feeling very satisfied with his game. In particular, White 64 and 68 were praised as moves that only Takemiya could have played. He used his thickness at the bottom of the board to attack the black group instead of trying to surround territory with, for instance, 64 at 67 or 70. Otake commented that 64 and 68 were the essence of the Takemiya style and that at this stage the game was developing as a masterpiece for him.

KK: I thought that 71 was a natural counterattack. Simply connecting at 72 is not in-

teresting. My plan was to force White to connect at 73, then connect myself at 72 and take aim at the cutting points in White's position.

AK: But the sequence from 72 on was severe. [White 72 was the sealed move.]

KK: Right. When White made the hane at 76, I realized that the game was not an easy one for me. But I wonder about White 80. Capturing the two stones at the top with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5* is much bigger. This would perhaps have been a loss for me. A trade follows with 6, but White can blithely discard the group with 7 and switch to ordinary endgame with 'a'. He'd have a safe 65 points of territory. H'm, it looks like a close contest on the board.



Dia. 5

AK: The meaning of White 80 is to attack the whole group.

KK: I was grateful for it — being able to connect at 85. Actually Black may still have been in a tough position.

AK: The consensus in Tokyo was that White was leading.

KK: But there is not such a big gap. If White plays a slack move in his attack, the game could go either way.

AK: The positional assessment at this stage is interesting. I asked a number of professionals and they all agreed that White was ahead, but a lot of them said that they couldn't predict what the actual result would be. The momentum of the player winning the match makes a big impression.

KK: If I'd been behind in the match, they would probably have said that Black's position was hopeless. It's just natural.

AK: But you had no intention of losing.

KK: No, as far as this game was concerned, I

thought that I was out of the running. Well, White also has some worrying points in his position, so I thought it would take a while for him to beat me.


AK: The contact play at 93 is one of the climactic points of the game. I felt that your fighting spirit, your boldness were expressed in this move.

KK: It's certainly a fighting move, but Black has no choice. If I don't play here, I can't make a game of it.

AK: But what would you do if White countered with a hane?

KK: I thought that White couldn't make the hane.

AK: That's an example of your boldness.



Dia. 6

KK: Playing the hane at 1 in *Dia. 6* starts a fight that will decide the game immediately. I hadn't clearly read it out, but apparently making two ataris with 4 and 6 is a clever counter. Black can then play the brilliant tesuji of 10. I learnt of this move from Yamabe Sensei. [If 11 and 13, Black has the follow-up of 14, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. If White plays 11 at 'c', Black moves out with 'd'; he is threatening to cut at 'e', then extend, so the fight will be too much for White.]

AK: It's quite a tesuji.

KK: If White had tried the hane, I would have thought with all my might. I can't say whether I would have discovered Yamabe Sensei's tesuji. There are various other unpleasant possibilities, so it would be quite frightening for White. Takemiya thought for about one hour before pulling back at 94. That may be the right move. It doesn't give White a bad game.

AK: Thanks for the explanation of what was going on here. Black 97, banging your head against a solid white position, was also a very forceful move.

KK: I was aiming at a counterattack. This was the only place to play.

AK: You said that this was your worst game, but for the spectator it was the most interesting.





Figure 3 (101-150)
9: connects (at 6)



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101-150). One move loses the game.

Black has to counterattack with 15; the proper move would be to extend at 'a', but that would lose.

AK: The climax of the game approaches with your counterattack at 15. Black 27 decided the game.

KK: Nothing else works. Perhaps Takemiya overlooked it because it's such a blunt move. Dia. 7 shows why White can't connect at 1. Black extends at 2 and captures the centre.


AK: After 10, cutting below 8 and the hane

below 9 are miai. I see, the marked black stone works very effectively.

KK: I went to a lot of trouble to make 27 possible. For example, Black 15. If Black played 23 first, followed by the 24 to 26 exchange, White would answer 15 by attaching at 'b'. Black 23 loses points, so Black must not play it first.

AK: Playing it after White 22 is perfect timing. I heard that 22 was the losing move.

KK: Yes, White should have pushed down at 1 in Dia. 8. The conclusion we came to was that at this stage blocking at 2 was the only move for Black, so White could then have played 3. Black would probably continue with 4 as in the game.



Dia. 8

AK: If then White 6, Black plays 'a' as in the game.

KK: So White will play 5 here. This is a good move: Black has no answer. I suppose I'd connect at 6. But then White can capture two corner stones in sente, so this is a big loss for Black. I had assumed that White would be reluctant to play 1, as it fills in his own liberties, but if he had played it I would have lost. Push down first or push down later: a subtle point like this decides the game.

AK: When White does push down at 28, he can't get Black to answer. Black takes eight stones with 29 and the game is over. You can't call this a trade. Still, it just shows how well you were playing: your weak group threatened and captured a strong group. Perhaps one could say that it was because you were his opponent that Takemiya went wrong.

Perhaps because of the shock from his slip with 22, Takemiya didn't play the endgame very well after this. For example, it would still have been a close game if he had played 34 at 39, making miai of invading at the 3-3 point at the top and jumping into the bottom corner with 'c'. White 34 and 36 are bad, because after Black

plays 35 and 37, White 'd' will no longer be sente. White 44 also is wrong: it should be at 'c'. When Black defends at 51 in the next figure, he locks up his win.




Figure 4 (151–200)
73: connects (at 66)

Figure 4 (151–200), Figure 5 (201–247)

The game ended at 5:58 p.m. 'Nine points on the board, isn't it?' said Kobayashi to Otake, the referee. Kobayashi always announces the result before the players count the score and he's always right, a habit which probably doesn't endear him to his opponents. He had reason to be pleased with himself: his record in the Kisei was now second only to that of Shuko, the player with

whom the title is indelibly associated in the minds of most fans.




Figure 5 (201–247)

Once again Takemiya had disappointed his fans and failed to live up to his own advance publicity. His best performance in the Kisei remains his challenge to Cho, but at least he redeemed himself in this final game. One of the major points of interest in go in the 1990s will be to see if he can overcome his Kobayashi complex and do himself full justice.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Time taken. White: 7 hours 36 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 38 minutes.)

('Igo Club', May 1989. Kisei report translated by John Power.)




Ironically Kobayashi defended the Kisei title with his worst game. However, it was perhaps the most eventful and exciting game of the series.


The Treasury of Life and Death

Su Kaiseki 5-dan

In this article we have collected a number of problems by Su 5-dan; they are taken from a regular series published by various professionals in *Go Weekly*. All the problems are of kyu level (at a guess, mainly around the mid-kyu range). The common feature of the ones we have selected is that the first move of the answer is on an unexpected point. Instead of relying on your intuition, you may have to resort to a process of elimination, but since there are only a few points to choose from in each case, we are confident you will be successful.

The composer, Su Kaiseki, was born in Shanghai in 1948. From 1980 to 1984 he was one of the teachers of the Nihon Ki-in inseis (apprentice professionals).






7. Black to play

The white group here looks even harder to kill than the one in Problem 7. With two black stones captured separately, surely White can make two eyes. The answer is: only if you let him.

9. Black to play


With the long L-shape inside his group, White seems to have a good chance of getting a second eye, but you have to stop him. The pitfall is that if you start with the wrong move, you may give him a seki.

Answers on page 58.



8. Black to play

The vital point is obvious: the problem is your follow-up. Needless to say, sacrifice is the theme.




9. Black to play

Good Style and Correct Shape


Cho Chikun, Honinbo, Judan & Tengen

The aim of this series is to help the reader acquire the knowledge of shape and style necessary to develop his judgement, so that he can make the right tactical decisions in the give and take of fighting at close quarters. In this instalment, we are looking at a basic technique that every go player knows, though he may not always apply it correctly. The problems themselves come from unfinished josekis, but the principle involved is applicable to all stages of the game. The key to the solution is not to make it too easy for the opponent.




Problem 18: Black to play

What is the best continuation for Black after White 5?



Problem 19: Black to play

The players are engaged in a struggle for centre influence. Black has two obvious moves: which is better?



Problem 20: Black to play

What is the best way for Black to attack the three white stones?


Answers on page 59

The Treasury of Life and Death: Answers


Continued from page 57

Answer to Problem 1

Black 1 is the vital point for defence. As the proverb says, 'the 2-1 point is often the vital point in the corner'. If White 2, Black simply connects at 3 and lives. If Black played 1 at 'a', White would block at 'b', forcing Black to play a ko.



Answer to 1




Answer to 2

Answer to Problem 2


Black 1, threatening to link up, is the key move. White must intercept at 2, but then Black cuts him off with 3 and 5, setting up a temporary 'seki' and killing White.

Answer to Problem 3

It can quickly be demonstrated that all other moves apart from 1 fail. If White makes a placement at 2, Black blocks at 3, and White can't save the stone. If White 'a' next, Black plays 'b'. If Black plays 1 at 3, White kills him with a placement at 1; next, 'a' and 'b' are miai for White.



Answer to 3



Answer to 4


Answer to Problem 4

Black 1 is the vital point. If White 2, he is obviously dead after Black 3, as 'a' and 'b' are miai. If Black starts with 1 at 3, then White lives with White 'b', Black 1, White 'a', Black 2, followed by the atari of White 'c'.


Answer to Problem 5

Black 1 is the only point that will ensure two eyes. If White 2, Black connects at 3, and White is now prevented from doing anything further by his lack of liberties. If Black plays 1 at 'a', White throws in at 2, then squeezes, killing Black. If in-

stead Black plays 1 at 3, he dies after White 1, Black 2, White 'b'.



Answer to 5




Answer to 6

Answer to Problem 6


Black 1 and 3 are a clever combination that take advantage of White's shortage of liberties. Even if White captures the four black stones on the top edge, he only gets one eye there, so in the meantime Black captures the stone on the left side and stops White from getting an eye there. If instead White captures Black 3, Black just connects his four stones — White can never atari the three black stones on the left side. If Black played 1 at 'a', White would block at 1 and live.

Answer to Problem 7

Black 1 may be a bit of a blind spot: a move like this is only possible in the corner. If White 2 at 3, Black will atari at 2 and make this a false eye, so White tries 2 here. Black forces with 3, then cuts at 5: White can't atari, so he dies. Note that if Black simply blocked at 2 instead of 1, White would play 1 and live.



Answer to 7



Answer to 8
5: at 3; 6: at 1


Answer to Problem 8

It's fairly obvious that if Black plays anywhere besides 1 (at 7, for example), White will get two eyes by playing at 1 himself. The problem is to discover the sacrificial theme of the solution. Once Black throws in at 5, there's no way for White to get two eyes.

Answer to Problem 9

Starting with the throw-in at 1 is the key. If White 2, Black easily kills him with 3. Black 1 at 'a' would let White live by playing White 3; if next Black 2, White gets a seki after White 1, Black 'b'.

('Go Weekly', 1989)




Answer to 9

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Continued from page 57

Answer to Problem 18

Dia. 1. Extending at 1 is too simple; White will be happy to link up with 2 and 4. This is not good enough for Black.




Dia. 1: inadequate

Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. The two-step hane of 1 is a tesuji. White can capture with 2 and 4, but this stone is a sacrifice to enable Black to take the corner. The result is clearly superior: White gets less territory than in Dia. 1, Black gets more and a much stronger shape to go with it.

Answer to Problem 19

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a peaceful move; it builds up influence on the right side.




Dia. 1: peaceful

Dia. 2: centre influence

Dia. 2. White can continue by pushing into the centre with 1 and 3. In some positions this centre influence might work very effectively. In order to prevent this —

Dia. 3. Black can make the two-step hane at 3. He may have a defect at 'a', but this way he can put up strong opposition to White's plans to

dominate the centre.




Dia. 3: fighting for the centre


Dia. 4: success

Dia. 4. The sequence to 6 is one possible continuation. A comparison with Dia. 2 will show how much extra influence Black has secured in the centre.

Dia. 5. The combination of 1 and 3 is White's standard counter. However, Black can still push along at 4, so he has gained by playing the two-step hane. Note that switching 3 to 4 is not recommended for White, as he takes gote with Black 'a', White 3.




Dia. 5: joseki



Dia. 6: submissive

Dia. 6. Let's see how effective the two-step hane can be in taking territory. When Black ex-

tends peacefully at 4, White flattens out his bottom area.



Dia. 7: a big gain


Dia. 7. If instead Black hanes at 4, the sequence to 10 is likely. This results in a lot of extra territory for Black. Of course, you have to be careful when playing 4, as White can exchange 'a' for Black 'b', creating a lot of defects in Black's shape. You should check that White can't do anything special before playing the two-step hane.

Answer to Problem 20


Dia. 1. Playing a hane at 1 is natural, but if Black continues with 3, White secures his position with 4. This takes the pressure off White. Playing 4 at 'a' is also possible.

Dia. 2. The two-step hane of 3 works perfectly here, as it sets up a peep at the vital point with


5. After forcing White to answer at 6, Black connects at 7. This is an ideal attack: Black has taken control in the centre and deprived White of his base on the side. White's result is far inferior to that in Dia. 1.



Dia. 1: easy for White



Dia. 2: the vital point




Dia. 3: thickness for Black

Dia. 3. White can avoid the result in Dia. 2 by playing 6 and 8, but Black will be satisfied, as he can build nice thickness on the right side if he captures at 'a'. He also has the option of switching 7 to Black 'b', White 7, Black 8.

(*'Kido'*, September 1986)


36 Tesuji Patterns

Sakata Eio, Hon. Honinbo




Pattern 16: White to play

How should White answer the marked stone?



Pattern 17: Black to play

After playing the three forcing moves at the bottom, Black should play lightly.




Pattern 18: White to play

Find White's best move.

Answers on page 62.


36 Life and Death Patterns

Kato Masao Oza




Pattern 16: Black to play

There are not many points to choose from, but even so making sure of two eyes for Black may not be easy.



Pattern 17: Black to play

Black has a bad problem with shortage of liberties. How can he use the two captured white stones to live? The hint is that Black can't expect to save all of his stones.



Pattern 18: White to play

It's obvious that White has to connect his stone to the right, but the way he does it will make all the difference.

Answers on page 63.

Go World News (continued)

Continued from page 9.

Chinese Tournaments

Wang Wins 1989 Men's Championship

Wang Jianhong 7-dan, who won the 7th World Amateur Go Championship in 1985, is now making his mark in professional go, like some of his predecessors as world champion. With a 9-2 score, Wang took first place in this year's men championship, played from 8 to 24 September in Fuzhou City. Second was Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan, who, with Wang, earned the right to play for China in the 3rd Fujitsu Cup, 3rd was Yu Bin 8-dan, 4th was Liao 7-dan, a player we haven't heard much of before, 5th was Liu 9-dan, and 6th Liang Weitang 7-dan. Neither Nie nor Ma participated.

The Women's Championship was won by Jui Naiwei 9-dan, who was supposed to have retired in May (see story on page 64).

Ma to Challenge for 1989 Mingren Title

Ma Xiaochun has won the 2nd Mingren (= Meijin) league and will challenge the title-holder Liu Xiaoguang in a best-of-five match. Like this year's Japanese Meijin league, the Chinese league ended in a tie, with both Ma and Qian Yuping 9-dan scoring 6-1, but Ma defeated Qian in the playoff. Since both these players have busy schedules, it was decided to make the playoff a lightning game, with 30 seconds per move.

Third place in the eight-man league was taken by Yu Bin 8-dan, the defeated finalist in the 1st Mingren title match, with 5-2. Nie came a disappointing fourth on 3-4. The other four players were eliminated from the league.


36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 60.


Answer to Problem 16

Dia. 1. White cuts at 1. This is the best way to take advantage of the hane that he has made at the head of Black's two stones just above. In other words, the natural strategy for White here is to place weight on the centre.

Black will probably answer by capturing with 2, so White gets two forcing moves with 3 and 5. When he connects at 7, he has built a solid position.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: bad for Black

Dia. 2. Black is hardly likely to capture at 4, as this lets White capture his key stones with 5. There are now no cutting points in White's position, so his thickness is superior to Dia. 1.

Dia. 3. Extending at 1 is slack. Black connects at the vital point with 2; if White now tries to force with 3, Black connects at 4, creating a cutting point in White's shape at 'a'. For White to reinforce would be gote.



Dia. 3: bad for White




Dia. 1: good shape

Answer to Problem 17

Dia. 1. Black's three stones here are forcing stones: they have made White answer on the inside, so they have served their purpose. Black would probably switch elsewhere now, but assuming that he is going to play a continuation here, the best move is something like the light move of 1. If White tries to capture the forcing stones with 2, the idea is to discard them, playing on the outside with 3 and 5. One can now see that Black 1 is in a good position: it is good shape. Next —

Dia. 2. If White 6, Black pulls back at 7. White is just making a solid position even more solid — how many eyes does he think he needs for his corner group? Moreover, provoking Black 7 hurts White's marked stone.




Dia. 2: overconcentrated

Dia. 3: heavy


Dia. 3. Black 1 can be described in one word: heavy! White peeps at 2, making Black yet heavier. Black's supposedly light stones have now become a target for attack.

Answer to Problem 18

Dia. 1. Attaching at 1 is a clever tesuji. The point is that if Black responds directly to 1, he endangers his two stones to the right. For example, if Black hanes at 2, White descends at 3; after 4, White can block at 5, thanks to the presence of 1. Black has trapped himself.




Dia. 1: trapped



Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Black will therefore probably answer at 2; this lets White build centre thickness with 3, but that can't be helped. Note that if Black uses 2 to turn at 'a', White should just block at 'b'.



Dia. 3: bad for White

Dia. 3. White 1 may be sente, but it gives White no good follow-up after Black 2. If White plays 3, to defend his cutting point, Black will be happy to push up at 'a'. Being sente in itself doesn't mean much.


(*'Let's Go'*, June 1983)

36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 61.

Answer to Problem 16

Dia. 1. Black 1 may seem to reduce the size of the space Black has to live in, but the aim is to exploit White's lack of liberties. White can't do anything on the inside, so the only thing left is to fill in liberties on the outside with 2 and 4. (Note that it doesn't matter whether Black starts with 1 or 3.) Black now captures at 5 in sente, so —




Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. Black 'a' and 'b' are miai, so Black is alive.

Dia. 3. Being in a hurry to capture two stones with 1 is a mistake. White will be able to destroy the eye to the left by throwing in where the marked stone is. White doesn't have to play at 'a' — even if Black plays there, he can't get two eyes, as White can make the 'bent four' shape in the corner.



Dia. 3: dead


Dia. 4: dead

Dia. 4. Switching 3 in Dia. 1 to 3 here fails, as Black dies after White makes the same throw-in (at the marked stone). Capturing the two stones and the three stones simultaneously is the only way to live.

Answer to Problem 17

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks silly, but actually it is the only way to live. If Black answers White 2 by capturing at 'a', he will die when White extends at 3, but instead he has the clever counter of 3, which makes miai of 'a' and 5.


Dia. 2. If White plays 2 here, Black makes a second eye with 3 and 5. White 2 at 'a' is no better: Black captures at 'b', making miai of 3-5 and capturing the white stone at 'a' with a throw-in at 2.



Dia. 1: sacrifice

Dia. 2: also alive

Dia. 3. The atari of 1 is on the wrong side, as now Black 3 and 5 don't work: White just extends at 6.




Dia. 3: dead

Dia. 4: dead

Dia. 4. If Black simply blocks at 1, White ataris at 2, then extends at 4. Black is now unable to atari from either side, so he dies. The point of the sacrifice with 1 in Dia. 1 was to make White 2 impossible.

Answer to Problem 18

Dia. 1. The diagonal connection of 1 is best. Black 2 and 4 may appear dangerous, but White calmly answers at 5. This is the key move. Black can atari at 6, but after 7 he can't play another move inside White's group, so White lives. If Black plays 2 at 4, White descends at 2 and lives easily.




Dia. 1: alive


Dia. 2:

Dia. 2. If White plays 5 in Dia. 1 at 1 here, he is dead after Black 2.

Dia. 3 (next page). The solid connection of 1 doesn't achieve much. Black just has to hane at 2 to stop White from getting enough space to form two eyes. White 1 at 'a' also fails when Black pushes along the edge at 'b'.



Dia. 3: dead



Dia. 4: dead

Dia. 4. White 1 seems to make the biggest eye space, but when Black pushes in at 2, the best White can do is to play a ko with 3 and 5.

The key to solving this problem is to discover the *oshi-tsubushi* technique in Dia. 1, that is, to set up a position in which Black can't connect two separate stones because of lack of liberties.

(*'Let's Go'*, June 1983)

Two Perspectives on Women's Go

World's First Woman 9-dan 'Retires'

The vaunted equality between men and women players in China is apparently not all that it's made out to be. Rui Naiwei, the first woman ever to win promotion to the pinnacle of the dan ladder, decided to 'retire' from active play in May this year because of a lack of opportunity. Instead of matching her wits with men across the go board, she decided to go to university.



Go gossips have not been slow to put a different interpretation on her decision. They surmise that Jui's parents have been putting pressure on her to get married; she is now 26, the age at which Oriental parents start to worry that a daughter might be left on the shelf, and since she hasn't paired up with anyone in the go world, she has to broaden her horizons — and give herself a wider choice — by following the traditional college route for finding a mate. If true, it seems that beneath the surface things haven't changed that much in China.

Miyazaki Goes to China to Study

Ironically, in view of Jui's retirement, Miyazaki Shimako 2-dan, the brightest new star in women's go in Japan, has taken a year's leave of absence from Japanese tournaments so that she can study in China. When Miyazaki toured China in May this year, the high level of women players there came as a shock to her; she lost confidence that she could reach their level in Japan, where she is so busy that she can't concentrate on studying, so she decided to go to China. Until now Japan has been the mecca for foreign go players: Miyazaki is the first player in the history of modern Japanese go to go overseas to get stronger.



Miyazaki has been living by herself in a hotel room in Beijing and studying with the Chinese players. She participated in a new tournament, the 1st Chinese Women's Mingren (= Meijin) Tournament, held from 12 to 20 August. She took 7th place among the 26 contestants — not bad for a 2-dan but not good for Japan's number one (when she left Japan she held two of the top three women's titles: the Women's Meijin and the Women's Kakusei).

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